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Abstract	  
The	   development	   of	   effective	   safety	   regulations	   for	   unmanned	   aircraft	   systems	   (UAS)	   is	   an	   issue	   of	  
paramount	  concern	  for	  industry.	  The	  development	  of	  this	  framework	  is	  a	  prerequisite	  for	  greater	  UAS	  access	  
to	  civil	  airspace	  and,	  subsequently,	   the	  continued	  growth	  of	   the	  UAS	   industry.	  The	  direct	  use	  of	   the	  existing	  
conventionally	   piloted	   aircraft	   (CPA)	   airworthiness	   certification	   framework	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	   UAS	   has	   a	  
number	  of	   limitations.	  The	  objective	  of	   this	  paper	   is	   to	  present	  one	  possible	  approach	   for	   the	  structuring	  of	  
airworthiness	  regulations	  for	  civilian	  UAS.	  The	  proposed	  approach	  facilitates	  a	  more	  systematic,	  objective	  and	  
justifiable	  method	  for	  managing	  the	  spectrum	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  diversity	  of	  UAS	  and	  their	  potential	  
operations.	  A	  risk	  matrix	  is	  used	  to	  guide	  the	  development	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  certification	  matrix	  (ACM).	  The	  
ACM	  provides	  a	   structured	  categorisation	   that	   facilitates	   the	   future	   tailoring	  of	   regulations	  proportionate	   to	  
the	  levels	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  the	  UAS.	  As	  a	  result,	  an	  objective	  and	  traceable	  link	  may	  be	  
established	  between	  mandated	  regulations	  and	  the	  overarching	  objective	  for	  an	  equivalent	  level	  of	  safety	  to	  
CPA.	  The	  ACM	  also	  facilitates	  the	  systematic	  consideration	  of	  a	  range	  of	  technical	  and	  operational	  mitigation	  
strategies.	  For	  these	  reasons,	  the	  ACM	  is	  proposed	  as	  a	  suitable	  method	  for	  the	  structuring	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  
certification	  framework	  for	  civil	  or	  commercially	  operated	  UAS	  (i.e.,	  the	  UAS	  equivalent	  in	  function	  to	  the	  Part	  
21	   regulations	   for	   civil	   CPA)	  and	   for	   the	   further	   structuring	  of	   requirements	  on	   the	  operation	  of	  UAS	   in	  un-­‐
segregated	  airspace.	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The	  development	  of	  an	  effective	   regulatory	   framework	   for	  unmanned	  aircraft	   systems	   (UAS4)	   is	  a	  major	  
concern	  for	  manufacturers	  and	  operators.	  Civil	  and	  military	  UAS	  operations	  are	  currently	  subject	  to	  restrictions	  
that	   significantly	   inhibit	   their	   flight	   within	   un-­‐segregated	   civil	   airspace	   and	   over	   populated	   areas.	   These	  
restrictions	  limit	  both	  the	  military	  and	  non-­‐military	  use	  of	  UAS.	  A	  greater	  degree	  of	  operational	  freedom	  will	  
only	   occur	   through	   the	   development	   of	   a	   framework	   inclusive	   of	   regulations,	   engineering	   and	   training	  
standards,	  flight	  rules	  and	  operational	  practices	  that	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  deliver,	  at	  a	  minimum,	  a	  level	  of	  safety	  
equivalent	   to	   that	   currently	   exhibited	   by	   civilian	   conventionally	   piloted	   aircraft	   (CPA).	   This	   requirement	   is	  
referred	  to	  as	  the	  equivalent	  level	  of	  safety	  (ELOS)	  objective	  (JAA	  2004;	  OSD	  2007;	  CAA	  2008).	  The	  particular	  
regulations	  discussed	  in	  this	  paper	  relate	  to	  the	  “airworthiness”	  (ADF	  2002)	  of	  the	  system	  being	  operated.	  A	  
brief	  introduction	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  airworthiness	  and	  its	  regulation	  is	  presented	  in	  Section	  §2.1.	  	  
Much	   effort	   is	   being	   devoted	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   standards	   specific	   to	   UAS	   (e.g.,	   the	   specification	   of	  
prescriptive	   requirements	   on	   aspects	   of	   their	   design,	   maintenance,	   manufacture	   and	   operation).	   However,	  
little	   consideration	   has	   been	   given	   to	   how	   these	   standards	   and	   regulations	   may	   be	   appropriately	   applied	  
across	   the	  diversity	  of	  UAS,	   their	  operations	  and	   the	  mitigation	   strategies	  widely	  employed.	  As	  discussed	   in	  
§2.2,	   there	   is	   currently	   no	   consensus	   on	   the	   specification	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   for	  UAS.	   The	   default	  
proposal	   is	   to	  apply	  the	  CPA	  airworthiness	  regulatory	  framework	  to	  that	  of	  UAS	  (Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  2008b).	  
Such	  an	  “off-­‐the-­‐shelf”	  (Clothier	  et	  al.	  2008)	  approach	  is	  implicitly	  based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  the	  application	  of	  
“equivalent”	   regulations	   will	   yield	   an	   ELOS,	   despite	   UAS	   being	   described	   as	   a	   fundamentally	   different	  
hazardous	  paradigm.	  Among	  many	  others,	  Hayhurst	  et	  al.	   (2006),	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	   (2008b),	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  
(2006,	   2008)	   and	  DeGarmo	   (2004)	   identify	   numerous	   differences	   between	  UAS	   and	   CPA	   that	   challenge	   the	  
suitability	   of	   the	   off-­‐the-­‐shelf	   approach.	   These	   include	   differences	   between	   the	   associated	   risks,	   design	  
philosophies,	  applications,	  operational	  concepts,	  and	  supporting	  business	  cases	  and	  differences	  between	  the	  
social	  and	  political	  attitudes	  towards	  the	  two	  technologies	  (further	  described	  in	  §2.3).	  As	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  
§2.3,	   the	   primary	   risks	   that	   governed	   the	   development	   of	   the	   CPA	   airworthiness	   regulatory	   framework	   are	  
different	  to	  those	  that	  should	  be	  used	  to	  guide	  the	  development	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  framework	  for	  UAS.	  This	  
dissimilarity	  can	  result	  in:	  airworthiness	  regulations	  that	  do	  not	  ensure	  the	  equitable	  management	  of	  the	  risks	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The	  plural	  acronym	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  singular,	  in	  accordance	  with	  OSD	  (2007)	  Unmanned	  Systems	  Roadmap,	  
2007–2032.	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense.	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across	   all	   types	   of	   UAS	   and	   their	   operations;	   the	   potential	   over-­‐regulation	   and	   hence	   imposition	   of	  
unnecessary	  costs	  to	  the	  UAS	  industry;	  or	  worse,	  an	  airworthiness	  regulatory	  framework	  that	  does	  not	  satisfy	  
the	  objective	  for	  an	  equivalent	  level	  of	  safety.	  
It	  has	  been	  concluded	  that	  UAS	  “will	  require	  a	  new	  regulatory	  framework	  to	  both	  maintain	  the	  safety	  of	  
the	  national	  airspace	  system	  and	  to	  enable	  the	  full	  benefit	  of	  unmanned	  aviation”	  (Hayhurst	  et	  al.	  2006).	  The	  
objective	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  present	  a	  practical	  framework	  for	  the	  effective	  regulation	  of	  the	  airworthiness	  of	  
civil	  UAS.	  
1.1 Guiding	  Principles	  
This	  leads	  to	  the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  are	  the	  properties	  of	  an	  effective	  regulation?	  The	  high-­‐level	  objective	  
for	   aviation	   safety	   regulations	   is	   to	   ensure	   the	   safe	   and	   effective	   operation	   of	   aircraft,	  with	   priority	   on	   the	  
former.	   Increased	   regulation	  often	   results	   in	   increased	  costs	   to	   the	   industry	  and,	   in	   turn,	  a	   reduction	   in	   the	  
potential	   benefits	   available	   to	   society	   (Fischhoff	   et	   al.	   1978).	   Regulations	   should	   therefore	   be	   defined	   and	  
promulgated	   proportionate	   to	   the	   estimated	   risks	   associated	   with	   the	   activity.	   This	   ensures	   that	   safety	  
objectives	   can	   be	   verified	   (e.g.,	   assurance	   that	   the	   regulations	   satisfy	   the	   ELOS	   objective)	   and	   that	   the	  
regulatory-­‐costs	  imposed	  on	  the	  industry	  are	  warranted.	  Under	  this	  premise,	  a	  justifiable	  position	  to	  guide	  the	  
specification	  of	  a	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  UAS	  resides	  in	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  risks	  associated	  with	  their	  
operation.	  	  
To	  summarise,	  an	  effective5	  regulatory	  framework	  for	  UAS	  should	  be:	  	  
	  
1. justifiable	  (i.e.,	  have	  a	  clear	  basis	  in	  risk	  and	  traceability	  to	  the	  ELOS	  objective),	  	  
2. flexible	   enough	   to	   accommodate	   the	   diversity	   of	   UAS	   designs,	   operations	   and	   mitigation	  
strategies,	  	  
3. systematic	  in	  its	  management	  of	  the	  risks	  across	  this	  diversity,	  
4. objective	   (i.e.,	   the	   underlying	   methodology	   should	   be	   independent	   of	   any	   single	   stakeholder’s	  
preferences),	  
5. practicable	  in	  its	  implementation	  (i.e.,	  regulatory	  authorities	  should	  have	  a	  workable	  framework),	  
and	  
6. cognisant	  of	  the	  costs	  that	  undue	  regulations	  impose	  on	  the	  industry,	  though	  not	  at	  the	  expense	  
of	  the	  objective	  for	  an	  ELOS.	  
	  
In	  consideration	  of	   the	  above	  guidance,	  a	  quantified	  risk	  matrix	   is	  proposed	  as	  a	  suitable	   framework	  for	  
guiding	   the	   structuring	   of	   regulations	   for	   the	   airworthiness	   of	   UAS	   and	   their	   integration	   into	   the	   National	  
Airspace	  System	  (NAS).	  The	  foundational	  concepts	  of	  the	  risk	  matrix	  are	  presented	  in	  Section	  §3	  in	  the	  context	  
of	   developing	   an	   airworthiness	   certification	   framework	   for	   UAS.	   The	   output	   is	   a	   systematic	   and	   flexible	  
framework	   equivalent	   in	   regulatory	   function	   to	   the	   existing	   civil	   CPA	   Part	   21	   regulation	   (CASA	   2003).	   The	  
airworthiness	  certification	  matrix	  (ACM)	  developed	  supports	  both	  an	  approach	  of	  regulation	  by	  “safety-­‐target”	  
(Haddon	  and	  Whittaker	  2002)	  and	  regulation	  by	  prescriptive	  codes	  of	  requirements.	  
Within	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   ACM,	   the	   composite	   of	   system	   type	   and	   operational	   environment	   defines	  
airworthiness	   categories.	   Regulations	  may	   then	  be	   tailored	   to	   a	   specific	   airworthiness	   category	   through	   the	  
quantification	  of	  measures	  of	   risk	   relative	   to	   the	  overarching	  goal	   for	  an	  ELOS.	  Such	  a	   top-­‐down	  tailoring	  of	  
regulations	   to	   the	   specific	   joint-­‐categories	   of	   system	   and	   operation	   establishes	   the	   scope	   for	   a	   bottom-­‐up	  
hazard	  analysis,	  as	  advocated	  by	  Hayhurst	  et	  al.	   (2006)	  and	  comprehensively	  described	  by	  Luxhøj	   (2009).	  An	  
example	  of	   the	   top-­‐down	   tailoring	  of	   regulations	   is	   described	   in	   Section	  §3.7.1.	   for	   the	   case	  of	  determining	  
Part	  1309	  regulations	  for	  UAS	  that	  are	  equivalent	  in	  terms	  of	  regulatory	  function	  to	  those	  mandated	  for	  CPA	  
[e.g.,	   Federal	   Aviation	   Administration	   (FAA)	   advisory	   circulars	   23.1309-­‐1D	   (FAA	   2009)	   and	   25.1309-­‐1A	   (FAA	  
1988)].	  An	  expanded	  and	  generalised	  risk	  matrix	  may	  also	  be	  used	  to	  structure	  other	  dimensions	  of	  regulation,	  
including	   the	  operational	   requirements	   governing	   the	   integration	  of	  UAS	  within	   the	  NAS.	   This	   application	   is	  
briefly	  discussed	  in	  Section	  §4.	  
In	   summary,	   it	   is	   proposed	   that	   the	   risk-­‐management	   approach	   described	   in	   this	   paper	   provides	   a	  
justifiable,	  flexible,	  systematic,	  objective	  and	  practical	  method	  for	  structuring	  the	  regulation	  of	  UAS.	  It	  permits	  
the	   incremental	   development	   of	   regulations	   and,	   in	   turn,	   the	   phased	   integration	   of	   UAS	   into	   the	  NAS.	   The	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  definition	  of	  a	   formal	  evaluation	  scheme	   is	  an	  area	  of	  ongoing	   research.	  The	   reader	   is	   referred	   to	   the	  
forthcoming	  work	  of	  Michael	  Nas	  (2011),	  Classifying	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems:	  Development	  of	  an	  Objective	  
Framework	  for	  Evaluating	  UAS	  Classification	  Schemes,	  Murdoch	  University,	  WA	  (unpublished).	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structuring	  of	  regulations	  based	  on	  the	  principles	  of	  a	  risk	  matrix	  also	  ensures	  that	  regulations	  are	  verifiable	  
against	   the	   overarching	   objective	   for	   an	   ELOS	   and	   that	   any	   impositions	   due	   to	   regulations	   are	   a	   justifiable	  
expense	  to	  the	  industry.	  	  
	  
2 An	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  UAS	  
The	  precedence	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	   international	   regulations	  governing	   the	  airworthiness	  of	   a	   civil	  
aircraft	   stems	   from	   the	  Chicago	  Convention	  of	   1944	   (ICAO	  2000).	   Article	   31	   of	   the	  Convention	   (ICAO	  2000)	  
requires	  aircraft	  to	  be	  certificated	  as	  airworthy,	  and	  under	  Article	  33	  these	  certificates	  must	  be	  recognised	  as	  
valid	  by	  the	  other	  contracting	  States	  provided	  they	  are	  equal	  to	  or	  above	  the	  minimum	  requirements	  specified	  
in	   the	   Convention	   (detailed	   in	   Annexes).	   Article	   8	   of	   the	   Convention	   stipulates	   the	   extension	   of	   these	  
requirements	   to	   UAS.	   As	   described	   in	   Annex	   8	   (ICAO	   2005)	   to	   the	   Convention,	   the	   objective	   of	   these	  
regulations	  is	  to	  achieve,	  “among	  other	  things,	  protection	  of	  other	  aircraft,	  third	  parties	  and	  property”.	  
There	  are	  several	  definitions	  for	  the	  concept	  of	  airworthiness,	  the	  most	  comprehensive	  of	  which	  identifies	  
the	   key	   components	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   and	   is	   provided	   in	   the	   Australian	   Defence	   Force	   (ADF)	  
instructions:	  
	  
…a	   concept,	   the	   application	   of	   which	   defines	   the	   condition	   of	   an	   aircraft	   and	   supplies	   the	   basis	   for	  
judgement	  of	   the	   suitability	   for	   flight	  of	   that	  aircraft,	   in	   that	   it	  has	  been	  designed,	  constructed,	  maintained	  
and	   is	   expected	   to	   be	   operated	   to	   approved	   standards	   and	   limitations,	   by	   competent	   and	   approved	  
individuals,	   who	   are	   acting	   as	  members	   of	   an	  approved	  organisation	   and	  whose	  work	   is	   both	   certified	   as	  
correct	  and	  accepted	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  ADF.	  	  
p.	  AL1,	  ADF	  2002	  
2.1 Airworthiness	  Certification	  
This	   section	   provides	   a	   brief	   overview	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   for	   civil	   CPA.	   For	   further	   detail	   the	  
reader	  is	  referred	  to	  CASA	  (2000),	  FAA	  (2004a)	  and	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  
In	  general,	  a	  Certificate	  of	  Airworthiness	  (COA)	  is	  issued	  for	  an	  individual	  aircraft	  if	  it	  meets	  the	  conditions	  
of	   the	   certification	   of	   its	   type	   (e.g.,	   make	   and	   model)	   against	   prescriptive	   requirements	   stipulated	   under	  
different	   airworthiness	   categories.	   According	   to	   the	   Australian	   Civil	   Aviation	   Safety	   Authority	   (CASA),	   an	  
aircraft	   airworthiness	   category	   “…	   is	   essentially	   a	   homogeneous	   grouping	   of	   aircraft	   types	   and	   models	   of	  
generally	   similar	   characteristics,	   based	  on	   the	  proposed	  or	   intended	  use	  of	   the	  aircraft,	   and	   their	   operating	  
limitations.”	  (CASA	  2000)	  
As	  described	  in	  civil	  aviation	  Part	  21	  regulations	  [e.g.,	  CASR	  1998	  Part	  21	  (CASA	  2003)	  or	  CFR	  Title	  14	  FAR	  
Part	  21	  (FAR	  2009)],	  aircraft	  types	  may	  be	  certificated	  in	  two	  classifications:	  
	  
1. Standard	   –	   broad	   categories	   of	   aircraft	   for	   which	   detailed	   prescriptive	   codes	   of	   requirements	  
(standards	  and	  limitations)	  are	  defined	  (i.e.,	  normal,	  commuter,	  transport,	  normal	  rotorcraft,	  and	  
transport	  rotorcraft,	  etc.),	  or	  	  
	  
2. Special	  –	  for	  those	  aircraft	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  the	  requirements	  of	  an	  applicable	  comprehensive	  and	  
detailed	   airworthiness	   code	   as	   required	   by	   a	   standard	   category	   (CASA	   2000).	   Special	   categories	  
include:	   primary,	   intermediate,	   restricted,	   limited	   and	   light	   sport	   aircraft,	   etc.,	   and	   the	  
designations:	  experimental,	  gliders,	  ultralights,	  etc.	  (CASA	  2000).	  
	  
For	  all	  aircraft	   certificated	   in	  a	   special	   category	  of	  airworthiness,	  operational	   limitations	  become	  part	  of	  
the	   conditions	   of	   the	   COA	   (FAA	   2004b).	   These	   limitations	   may	   include	   restrictions	   on	   manoeuvres,	   speed,	  
number	   of	   passengers,	   activities	   undertaken	   and	  where	   flights	  may	  be	   conducted.	   Experimental	   certificates	  
are	  issued	  to	  individual	  aircraft	  and	  only	  for	  specific	  activities	  (e.g.,	  research	  and	  development,	  demonstration	  
and	   training,	   etc.).	   An	   aircraft	   operating	   under	   an	   experimental	   certificate	   cannot	   be	   flown	   for	   commercial	  
reward.	  	  
Special	  flight	  permits	  may	  also	  be	  granted	  to	  an	  aircraft	  that	  does	  not	  meet	  the	  applicable	  airworthiness	  
requirements,	  but	  can	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  be	  capable	  of	  safe	  flight	  for	  a	  specified	  list	  of	  activities	  (e.g.,	  
demonstration,	  delivery	  of	  an	  aircraft,	  search	  and	  rescue,	  or	  assisting	  in	  a	  state	  of	  emergency).	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2.2 Current	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Regulations	  for	  Civil	  UAS	  	  
Currently,	   there	  are	  no	   specific	   standards	  and	   regulations	   for	   the	   type	   certification	  of	   civil	  UAS.	   In	   their	  
absence,	  the	  risks	  to	  people	  and	  property	  on	  the	  ground	  are	  assured	  through	  substantial	  restrictions	  on	  where	  
UAS	  operations	  can	  take	  place.	  An	  individual	  UAS	  may	  be	  certificated	  in	  the	  experimental	  designation	  [e.g.,	  as	  
described	   in	  AC	  21-­‐43(0)	   (CASA	  2006)],	   for	   specific	   applications	   and	  not	   for	   commercial	   reward,	  but	   remain	  
subject	   to	  operational	   restrictions	   [e.g.,	   in	  Australia	   these	   restrictions	  are	  contained	   in	  CASR	  Part	  101	   (CASA	  
2004)].	  Operational	  regulations	  such	  as	  CASR	  Part	  101	  (CASA	  2004),	  prescribe	  the	  requirement	  for	  a	  COA	  based	  
on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   operation	   performed	   [e.g.,	   whether	   the	   unmanned	   aircraft	   (UA)	   is	   operated	   over	   a	  
populous	  area	  or	  not].	  The	  regulations	  do	  not	  define	  type	  categories	  or	  categories	  of	  airworthiness	  for	  which	  
COA	  can	  be	  issued.	  
The	   absence	   of	   an	   airworthiness	   certification	   framework,	   and	   the	   subsequent	   operational	   limitations	  
imposed,	   come	   at	   significant	   expense	   to	   the	   UAS	   industry.	   Requisite	   to	   the	   realisation	   of	   routine	   UAS	  
operations	   in	   the	  NAS	  are	   regulations	   that	   facilitate	   the	   certification	  of	   an	  UAS	  as	  airworthy.	  At	   the	  highest	  
level	  these	  regulations	  comprise:	  
	  
1. a	   certification	   framework	   specifying	   the	   conditions	   for	   prescribing	   different	   airworthiness	  
regulations	   to	   different	   types	   of	   UAS	   operations,	   i.e.,	   a	   framework	   equivalent	   in	   regulatory	  
function	  to	  civil	  CPA	  regulation	  Part	  21;	  and	  
	  
2. standards,	   procedures	   and	   recommended	   practices	   governing	   the	   design,	   manufacture,	  
maintenance	  and	  operation	  of	  UAS	  tailored	  to	  each	  of	  the	  airworthiness	  certification	  categories,	  
i.e.,	   airworthiness	   standards	   equivalent	   in	   regulatory	   function	   to	   the	   prescriptive	   codes	   of	  
requirements	  contained	  in	  civil	  CPA	  regulations	  Part	  23,	  25,	  27,	  29,	  etc.	  
	  
Much	   effort	   has	   been	   directed	   towards	   addressing	   the	   second	   of	   these	   two	   components.	   In	   particular,	  
regulations	  that	  provide	  assurances	  in	  the	  airworthiness	  of	  the	  “system”,	  which	  encompasses	  the	  UA,	  human	  
elements,	   communications	  and	  ground	   infrastructure,	   as	  opposed	   to	   that	  of	   just	  an	   “aircraft”.	   For	  example,	  
Hayhurst	   et	   al.	   (2006)	   and	   Luxhøj	   (2009)	   identify	   unique	   hazards	   that	   must	   be	   addressed	   in	   low-­‐level	  
airworthiness	   regulations	   (i.e.,	   standards,	   and	   operational	   requirements	   covering	   unique	   aspects	   of	   UAS	  
including:	   autonomy,	   communication	   links,	   and	   ground	   control	   systems,	   etc.).	   Standards	   development	  
organisations,	   such	  as	  ASTM	  Committee	  F38,	  and	   the	  NATO	  Standardization	  Agency	   (NATO	  2009),	  have	  also	  
made	   progress	   in	   defining	   airworthiness	   standards	   specific	   to	   UAS.	   However,	   limited	   research	   has	   been	  
conducted	   into	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   overarching	   certification	   framework	   that	   dictates	   the	   conditions	   for	  
promulgation	  of	  these	  low-­‐level	  regulations.	  	  
The	  apparent	  consensus,	  a	  default	  position	  of	  regulatory	  groups,	  is	  that	  the	  airworthiness	  framework	  for	  
UAS	  should	  be	  based	  on	  that	  for	  CPA	  of	  the	  same	  category	  (Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  2008b),	  with	  a	  number	  of	  novel	  
strategies	  being	  proposed	  for	  determining	  equivalency	  between	  categories	  of	  UAS	  and	  CPA	  [e.g.,	  see	  Grimsley	  
(2004)].	   However,	   to	   prescribe	   the	   same	   airworthiness	   framework	   to	   UAS	   fails	   to	   address	   significant	  
differences	  between	  the	  two	  technologies.	  As	  described	  by	  DeGarmo	  (2004):	  
	  
Premising	   a	   UAV	   regulatory	   structure	   based	   on	   manned	   aircraft	   makes	   sense,	   but	   developing	   such	  
regulations	   to	   cover	   the	   vast	   array	   of	   UAVs	  will	   be	   a	   challenge.	   There	   are	   too	  many	   differences,	   especially	  
concerning	   the	   small	   UAVs.	   Therefore,	   expectations	   that	   all	   UAVs	   can	   conform	   to	   existing	   regulatory	  
requirement	  may	  not	  be	  realistic.	  
p.	  2-­‐46,	  DeGarmo	  (2004)	  
	  
Amongst	  many	  others,	  Hayhurst	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  DeGarmo	  (2004),	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  (2008b),	  and	  Clothier	  
et	   al.	   (2008)	   identify	   numerous	   differences	   between	   the	   risk	   paradigms	   of	   CPA	   and	  UAS	   that	   influence	   the	  
development	  of	  airworthiness	  regulations	  for	  UAS.	  The	  following	  section	  describes	  some	  of	  these	  differences.	  
The	  objective	   is	  not	  to	  categorically	  prove	  that	  the	  existing	  CPA	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  would	  
not	  work	  for	  UAS,	  but	  rather,	  to	  justify	  the	  need	  to	  explore	  potentially	  more	  effective	  strategies.	  	  
2.3 Challenges	  of	  UAS	  	  
Historically	  the	  primary	  purpose	  of	  airworthiness	  regulations	  for	  civil	  CPA	  has	  been	  to	  ensure	  the	  safety	  of	  
the	   people	   over-­‐flown	   (Haddon	   and	   Whittaker	   2002;	   JAA	   2004);	   however,	   with	   the	   rise	   of	   commercial	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passenger	  operations,	  the	  focus	  now	  includes	  aircrew	  and	  passengers	  (JAA	  2004).	  Analysis	  of	  accident	  statistics	  
reveals	   that	   the	  primary	  people	  at	   risk	  due	   to	   the	  hazards	  of	  CPA	  operations	  are	   those	  onboard	   the	  aircraft	  
(Clothier	  and	  Walker	  2006).	  Consequently,	  CPA	  safety	  regulations	  implicitly	  aim	  to	  limit	  or	  eliminate	  harm	  to	  
those	   aboard	   the	   aircraft,	   and	   secondarily	   to	   those	   over-­‐flown	   (Hayhurst	   et	   al.	   2006).	   This	   prioritisation	  
facilitates	   the	   “common	   philosophy”	   (Haddon	   and	   Whittaker	   2002)	   foundational	   to	   CPA	   airworthiness	  
regulations,	   specifically	   the	  philosophy	   that	   “as	   far	  as	   is	  practicable,	   they	   (airworthiness	   codes	  of	   regulatory	  
requirements)	  avoid	  any	  presumption	  of	  the	  purposes	  for	  which	  the	  aircraft	  will	  be	  used	  in	  service”	  (Haddon	  
and	  Whittaker	  2002)	  and	  hence	  are	  largely	   independent	  of	  the	  regions	  being	  over-­‐flown.	  This	   is	  a	  defensible	  
position	  for	  CPA,	  as	  there	  will	  always	  be	  someone	  at	  risk	  (i.e.,	  at	  a	  minimum	  the	  pilot)	  and	  that	  addressing	  the	  
risks	  to	  those	  onboard	  an	  aircraft	  will	  inherently	  address	  the	  risks	  to	  those	  over-­‐flown	  (Haddon	  and	  Whittaker	  
2002;	  Clothier	  and	  Walker	  2006).	  	  
For	  UAS,	   it	  cannot	  be	  assumed	  that	  there	  are	  people	  onboard	  the	  aircraft.	  The	  primary	  risks	  due	  to	  UAS	  
operations	  are	  to	  entities	  of	  value	  (EOV)	  that	  are	  external	  to	  the	  system	  (i.e.,	  external	  to	  the	  immediate	  subject	  
of	   regulation).	   These	   EOV	   include	   the	   people	   and	   property	   over-­‐flown	   and	   other	   airspace	   users	   within	   the	  
operational	   environment.	   For	   regulatory	  matters	  pertaining	   to	   the	   integration	  of	  UAS	  operations	  within	   the	  
NAS,	  the	  primary	  EOV	  are	  other	  aircraft	  and	  the	  people	  onboard	  them	  through	  the	  hazard	  of	  mid-­‐air	  collision.	  
If	  the	  primary	  consequence	  of	  concern	  was	  the	  degree	  of	  damage	  to	  the	  aircraft,	  then	  airworthiness	  could	  be	  
considered	  largely	  independent	  of	  the	  operating	  environment	  (although	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  type	  of	  terrain	  
and	  other	  environmental	  conditions	  would	  play	  a	  part).	  However,	   recalling	  Annex	  8	   to	   the	   ICAO	  Convention	  
(ICAO	  2005),	  the	  primary	  risks	  of	  concern	  are	  to	  the	  EOV	  (i.e.,	  the	  people	  and	  property)	  over-­‐flown,	  which	  have	  
the	   potential	   to	   experience	   harm	   due	   to	   falling	   parts	   or	   a	   crashing	   aircraft.	   Thus,	   the	   levels	   of	   risk	   to	   be	  
controlled	   by	   UAS	   airworthiness	   regulations	   are	   highly	   dependent	   on	   where	   the	   system	   is	   operated.	   For	  
example,	  a	  large	  UAS	  operated	  over	  a	  built-­‐up	  residential	  area	  presents	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  risk	  (with	  respect	  to	  
the	   people	   and	   property	   over-­‐flown)	   than	   the	   same	   UAS	   operated	   over	   an	   unpopulated	   area.	   Graphical	  
illustrations	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  this	  dependency	  are	  provided	  in	  Weibel	  and	  Hansman	  (2004),	  Clothier	  and	  Walker	  
(2006),	  and	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  (2009).	  Thus,	  the	  required	  certification	  basis	  for	  a	  particular	  UAS	  is	  a	  function	  of	  
the	  system	  and	   the	  properties	  of	   its	   intended	  operational	  environment	   (e.g.,	   the	  density	  and	  distribution	  of	  
EOV	  over-­‐flown,	  sheltering,	  etc.).	  McGeer	  et	  al.	  (1999)	  encapsulate	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  problem:	  
	  
…	  with	  a	  manned	  aircraft	  you	  have	  to	  build	  to	  the	  same	  standard	  no	  matter	  what	  is	  underneath	  you,	  but	  
among	  unmanned	  aircraft,	  acceptable	  safety	  for	  flights	  exclusively	  over	  oceans	  can	  be	  achieved	  with	  rather	  
more	   rickety	  machines	   than	   would	   be	   fit	   to	   fly	   over	   a	   city.	   Hence	   the	   abundance	   of	   possibilities	   which	  
everyone	  recognises	  and	  is	  struggling	  to	  manage.	  
	  
p.	  11,	  McGeer	  and	  Vagners	  (1999)	  
	  
To	  further	  complicate	  the	  problem,	  there	  is	  significant	  diversity	  in	  UAS	  compared	  to	  CPA.	  The	  comparative	  
histograms	  of	  UA	  and	  CPA	  maximum	  takeoff	  weight	  (MTOW)	  and	  maximum	  operating	  speed	  shown	  in	  Figure	  1	  
and	   Figure	   2,	   respectively,	   provide	   a	   graphical	   illustration	   of	   the	   magnitude	   of	   this	   diversity.	   Evident	   from	  
Figure	  1	  and	  Figure	  2,	   is	   that	   the	  MTOW	  of	   the	  UAS	   fleet	   ranges	   from	  a	   few	  grams	   through	   to	  hundreds	  of	  
tonnes,	  whereas	  for	  the	  CPA	  fleet,	  the	  MTOW	  ranges	  from	  a	  few	  hundred	  kilograms	  through	  to	  thousands	  of	  
tonnes.	  The	  existing	  certification	  categories	  provided	   in	  CPA	  regulations	  do	  not	  adequately	  cover	   this	   range.	  
Also	  evident	  in	  the	  histograms	  are	  UAS	  types	  that	  can	  operate	  in	  much	  lower	  and	  higher	  speed	  regimes	  than	  
that	   of	   the	   CPA	   fleet.	   Both	   speed	   and	  MTOW	   are	   factors	   that	   influence	   the	   risks	   presented	   to	   people	   and	  
property	  on	  the	  ground.	  Hence,	  the	  risk	  profile	  to	  be	  managed	  for	  UAS	  is	  larger	  than	  that	  for	  the	  CPA	  fleet.	  A	  
certification	   framework	   should	  ensure	   that	   risks	   are	  managed	   systematically	   across	   the	  diversity	  of	   systems	  
and	  operations	  (i.e.,	  that	  low-­‐level	  airworthiness	  regulations	  are	  prescribed	  commensurate	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  
risk	  associated	  with	   the	  operations	   for	   all	   types	  of	  UAS).	   If	   the	  CPA	  airworthiness	   certification	   framework	   is	  
applied	   to	   UAS,	   it	   would	   not	   be	   possible	   to	   objectively	   show	   compliance	   to	   the	   ELOS	   requirement	   at	   a	  
minimum	  imposed	  cost,	  particularly	  for	  those	  types	  and	  operations	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  UAS.	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Figure	  1	  –	  Histogram	  of	  aircraft	  maximum	  take-­‐off	  weight6	  
	  
	  
Figure	  2	  –	  Histogram	  of	  aircraft	  maximum	  operating	  speed	  6	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  UAS	  data	  supplied	  from	  a	  database	  compiled	  and	  maintained	  by	  the	  Defence	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Organisation	  (DSTO),	  Australia.	  
CPA	  data	  obtained	  from	  Aviation	  Week	  and	  Space	  Report	  (http://www.aviationweek.com)	  and	  Jane's	  All	  the	  World's	  Aircraft	  
(http://catalog.janes.com/catalog/public/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.ProductInfoBrief&product_id=96083).	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For	  CPA	  a	  single	  certification	  category	  typically	  covers	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  applications	  for	  the	  particular	  type.	  
Take,	   for	   example,	   a	   helicopter	   performing	   traffic	   surveillance	   over	   highly	   populated	   areas	   and	   inspecting	  
power	   lines	   in	   remote	   areas.	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   specific	   payloads,	   pilot	   training	   and	   other	   operational	  
approvals	   both	   operations	   could	   be	   conducted	   under	   the	   same	   COA.	   Consider	   the	   same	   applications	   being	  
performed	   by	   an	   unmanned	   helicopter.	   A	   higher	   level	   of	   regulation	   would	   be	   required	   for	   the	   unmanned	  
helicopter	  to	  be	  able	  to	  perform	  traffic	  monitoring	  over	  a	  populated	  area	  than	  that	  required	  to	  monitor	  power	  
lines	   in	   remote	   regions.	  This	   is	  due	   to	   the	  dependency	  on	   the	  operational	  environment	  over-­‐flown.	  A	  single	  
UAS	  design	  may	  be	  used	  for	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  applications,	  from	  fire	  fighting,	  search	  and	  rescue	  over	  a	  remote	  
region,	   tracking	  wildlife	  migrations,	   to	  persistent	  surveillance	  over	  a	  heavily	  populated	  area.	  As	   illustrated	   in	  
the	  above	  example	  and	  as	  further	  discussed	  by	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2006;	  2008),	  the	  different	  UAS	  applications	  may	  
be	   required	   to	  meet	   different	   airworthiness	   standards.	   There	  may	   also	   be	   cases	  where	   the	   level	   of	   system	  
airworthiness	   could	   be	   determined	   by	   the	   cost	   of	   system	   attrition,	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   required	   level	   of	  
reliability	  of	  an	  “equivalent”	  CPA	  performing	  the	  same	  operation	  (McGeer	  et	  al.	  1999;	  McGeer	  2007;	  Clothier	  
et	  al.	  2008).	  Hence,	  the	  “common	  philosophy”	  described	  by	  Haddon	  and	  Whittaker	  (2002)	  that	  underpins	  the	  
certification	  of	  CPA	  may	  not	  be	  directly	  applicable	  to	  UAS.	  
For	  CPA,	  a	  standard	  COA	  is	  issued	  against	  a	  type	  certificate	  that	  prescribes	  a	  certification	  baseline	  (a	  fixed	  
description	  of	   the	  aircraft	  components	  and	  their	  approved	  configuration).	  Some	  UAS,	  particularly	  small	  UAS,	  
can	  be	  highly	  modular	  in	  their	  airframes,	  payloads	  and	  supporting	  equipment,	  allowing	  them	  to	  be	  quickly	  and	  
radically	   tailored	   to	   a	   particular	   mission	   or	   environment.	   For	   example:	   fuselage	   and	   wing	   sections	   can	   be	  
changed	  between	  operations.	   It	  may	  be	  difficult	   to	  define	  a	   single	   certification	  baseline	   for	   a	  UAS	   type	  and	  
instead	  a	  large	  number	  of	  configurations	  may	  need	  to	  be	  defined	  as	  part	  of	  the	  type	  certification.	  
Finally,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   range	   of	   mitigation	   measures	   commonly	   used	   by	   UAS,	   for	   example,	   parachute	  
recovery	  systems,	   frangibility,	  and	  self-­‐termination	  systems,	  all	  of	  which	  may	  be	   implemented	  to	  reduce	  the	  
risk	   that	   a	   UAS	   presents	   to	   the	   EOV	   over-­‐flown.	   Within	   the	   CPA	   certification	   framework,	   such	   mitigation	  
measures	   are	   evaluated	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis,	   as	   they	   are	   not	   traditionally	   considered	   part	   of	   the	  
certification	  baseline	   for	  a	  standard	  COA.	  For	  UAS,	   these	  mitigation	  strategies	  may	  form	  a	  significant	  part	  of	  
the	  safety	  case;	  therefore,	  a	  systematic	  method	  for	  accommodating	  them	  is	  needed.	  	  
2.3.1 Summary	  
	  Among	  others,	  McGeer	  and	  Vagners	  (1999),	  DeGarmo	  (2004),	  Hayhurst	  et	  al.	  (2006),	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  
(2008b),	  and	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2006,	  2008)	  identify	  numerous	  differences	  between	  UAS	  and	  CPA	  that	  challenge	  
the	  suitability	  of	  an	  off-­‐the-­‐shelf	  approach	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  UAS.	  The	  principal	   issue	   identified	  being	  the	  
difference	  in	  the	  risks	  to	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  airworthiness	  regulations.	  
In	   summary,	   the	   level	  of	   airworthiness	   for	   civil	  UAS	   should	  be	  determined	  by	   the	  potential	   for	  harm	   to	  
people	  and	  property	  over-­‐flown,	  which	  is	  a	  function	  of	  the	  reliability	  of	  the	  system	  and	  a	  function	  of	  where	  it	  is	  
operated.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   for	   CPA	   the	   level	   of	   airworthiness	   is	   principally	   defined	   by	   the	   risk	   to	   those	  
onboard	   and	   is	   largely	   treated	   independent	   of	   the	   region	   over-­‐flown	   (Haddon	   and	   Whittaker	   2002).	   As	   a	  
consequence,	   the	   application	   of	   the	   CPA	   airworthiness	   certification	   framework	   (i.e.,	   existing	   airworthiness	  
certification	  categories	  and	   low-­‐level	   regulations	   that	  are	  mandated	   independent	  of	   the	  area	  over-­‐flown)	   to	  
civil	  UAS	  could	  result	  in:	  	  
• the	   inequitable	   management	   of	   the	   risks	   across	   the	   different	   airworthiness	   certification	  
categories	  (i.e.,	  different	  categories	  being	  managed	  to	  different	  levels	  of	  risk);	  	  
• different	   UAS	   operations	   over	   particular	   regions	   may	   be	   over-­‐regulated,	   or	   worse,	   present	   an	  
unacceptable	  level	  of	  risk	  [refer	  to	  illustrations	  of	  geospatial	  operational	  dependency	  provided	  in	  
Weibel	  and	  Hansman	  (2004),	  Clothier	  and	  Walker	  (2006),	  and	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  (2009)];	  or	  
• the	   imposition	  of	  unjustified	   costs	   to	   the	  UAS	   industry	   [as	   shown	   in	   the	  example	  presented	  by	  
Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2008)].	  	  
Recalling	   that	   the	   primary	   purpose	   of	   air-­‐safety	   regulations	   is	   to	   provide	   assurances	   in	   the	   safety	   of	  
aviation	  at	   a	   justifiable	   cost	   to	   the	   industry;	   then	   the	   justification	   for	   applying	   the	  existing	  CPA	   certification	  
framework	  to	  UAS	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  safety	  is	  significantly	  weakened.	  Other	  issues	  identified	  included	  unique	  UAS	  
types,	  operations	  and	  risk	  profiles,	  and	  the	  dynamic	  configuration	  of	  some	  UAS.	  	  	  
To	  summarise,	   the	  CPA	  framework	  consisting	  of	  a	  small	  number	  of	   type-­‐certification	  categories	   that	  are	  
mandated	   independent	   of	   the	   operation	   may	   not	   provide	   the	   flexibility	   required	   to	   accommodate	   the	  
spectrum	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  the	  diversity	  of	  UAS,	  their	  operational	  environments,	  their	  applications,	  the	  
reconfigurable	  nature	  of	  the	  systems,	  and	  potential	  mitigation	  strategies	  that	  are	  readily	  employed.	  The	  direct	  
application	   of	   the	   existing	   CPA	   airworthiness	   framework	   may	   not	   ensure	   the	   consistent	   and	   equitable	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management	  of	   the	  risks	  associated	  with	  UAS	  operations	  and	  may	  not	   justify	   the	  costs	   imposed	  on	  the	  UAS	  
industry	  and	  operators.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  authors	  do	  not	  make	  the	  categorical	  assertion	  that	  the	  
application	   of	   the	   existing	   CPA	   regulatory	   framework	   will	   not	   work	   for	   UAS,	   nor	   that	   existing	   low-­‐level	  
standards	  and	  regulations	  (e.g.,	  those	  contained	  in	  Part	  25)	  are	  not	  relevant	  to	  UAS.	  Instead,	  the	  emphasis	  is	  
on	  the	  identification	  of	  some	  limitations	  in	  the	  structure	  governing	  their	  application	  to	  UAS;	  and	  hence	  there	  is	  
justification	  to	  explore	  an	  alternative	  structure	  (i.e.,	  an	  equivalent	  Part	  21	  regulation	  specifically	  for	  UAS).	  	  
	  
3 A	  Risk-­‐Management	  Approach	  
One	  approach	   to	   the	   regulation	  of	   airworthiness	   for	  UAS	   is	   to	  prescribe	   standards	  and	   regulations	  on	  a	  
case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  dependent	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  of	  the	  operation.	  The	  approach	  has	  been	  referred	  to	  as	  a	  
safety-­‐target	   approach	   (Haddon	  and	  Whittaker	   2002)	   and	  has	   been	   advocated	   for	   the	   regulation	  of	   smaller	  
UAS	  (McGeer	  et	  al.	  1999).	  The	  safety-­‐target	  approach	  is	   justifiable	  and	  offers	  flexibility	   in	  the	  regulation	  of	  a	  
diverse	   and	   dynamic	   industry.	   However,	   as	   discussed	   by	   Haddon	   and	   Whittaker	   (2002)	   a	   number	   of	  
disadvantages	   arise.	   In	   particular,	   there	   are	   issues	   concerning	   the	   practicality	   of	   implementation	   and	  
international	  standardisation	  and	  harmonisation.	  In	  addition,	  the	  absence	  of	  general	  prescriptive	  codes	  of	  low-­‐
level	   airworthiness	   regulations	   may	   lead	   to	   subjectivity	   as	   to	   how	   applicants	   interpret	   regulations	   and	   to	  
inconsistencies	  in	  the	  evaluation	  of	  a	  safety	  case	  by	  the	  regulator.	  Consequently,	  trade-­‐offs	  can	  exist	  between	  
the:	  
	  
1. flexibility	  afforded	  by	  the	  framework,	  
2. consistency	  of	  the	  regulatory	  oversight	  afforded,	  and	  	  
3. practicality	  of	  implementation.	  	  	  
	  
	  To	  ensure	  a	  workable	  management	  strategy,	  this	  paper	  proceeds	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  will	  be	  necessary	  to	  
define	   fixed	   airworthiness	   categories	   within	   the	   diversity	   of	   UAS	   and	   their	   operations.	   However,	   it	   is	   the	  
authors’	   belief	   that	   some	   of	   the	   defined	   airworthiness	   categories	   (i.e.,	   small	   UA	   and/or	   operations	   over	  
unpopulated	  regions)	  may	  be	  more	  effectively	   regulated	  under	  a	  safety-­‐target	  approach.	  Thus,	   in	   this	  paper	  
the	  method	  of	  regulation	  (i.e.,	  whether	  a	  prescriptive	  code	  of	  regulation	  or	  safety-­‐target)	  to	  be	  applied	  to	  each	  
UAS	   airworthiness	   category	   is	   not	   prescribed.	   This	   paper	   instead	   addresses	   the	   crux	   of	   the	   problem,	  
determining	   the	   framework	   of	   airworthiness	   categories	   (e.g.,	  what	   constitutes	   a	   small	   or	   low-­‐risk	   UAS?)	   to	  
which	  regulations	  and	  standards	  may	  then	  be	  tailored.	  
The	   purpose	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   is	   to	   provide	   assurances	   that	   the	   risks	   associated	   with	   the	  
operation	   of	   UAS	   over	   populous	   areas	   are	   managed	   to	   an	   appropriate	   level.	   Secondarily,	   the	   process	   of	  
defining	   these	   regulations	   should	   be	   cognisant	   of	   the	   potential	   costs	   imposed	   on	   the	   industry	   and	   the	  
reduction	   in	  benefit	  to	  society.	  Solving	  such	  a	  multi-­‐objective	  problem	  is	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  risk-­‐management	  
process.	   According	   to	   internationally	   accepted	   standards	   (AS/NZS	   2009),	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   risk-­‐
management	   framework	   encompasses	   processes	   for	   the	   identification,	   assessment,	   evaluation,	   mitigation,	  
communication	  and	  monitoring	  of	  a	  hazardous	  activity	  or	  technology.	  All	  components	  of	  the	  risk-­‐management	  
activity	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  development	  of	  regulations	  for	  UAS;	  however,	  of	  specific	  interest	  in	  this	  paper	  are	  
risk	  matrices,	  a	  tool	  widely	  used	  to	  evaluate	  risk.	  	  
Risk	   matrices	   provide	   a	   simple	   and	   clear	   framework	   for	   the	   systematic	   review	   of	   individual	   risks	   and	  
portfolios	  of	   risk	   (Cox	  2008).	  A	   risk	  matrix	   structures	  a	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  assessment	  of	   risk	   into	   its	  
fundamental	  components:	  a	   loss	  outcome	  for	  a	  given	  scenario	  and	  a	  measure	  of	   the	  uncertainty	   in	  realising	  
that	   scenario	   and	   outcome.	   A	   qualitative,	   continuous	   or	   ranked	   scale	   is	   defined	   for	   each	   component,	   and	  
together	  they	  form	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  risk	  matrix.	  The	  columns	  of	  the	  risk	  matrix	  may	  be	  defined	  through	  
the	   discretisation	   of	   the	   range	   of	   potential	   loss	   or	   the	   ordinal	   ranking	   of	   qualitative	   specifications	   of	   loss.	  
Similarly,	  rows	  can	  be	  defined	  through	  the	  discretisation	  of	  the	  range	  of	  uncertainty	  or	  the	  ordinal	  ranking	  of	  
qualitative	   specifications	  of	   uncertainty.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   preserve	  orthogonality	   in	   the	   specification	  of	   the	  
two	   component	   axes,	   a	   property	   fundamental	   to	   the	   concept	   of	   risk	   as	   a	   multidimensional	   and	   multi-­‐
echeloned	  space	  (Kaplan	  et	  al.	  2001;	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  2011),	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  more	  simplistic	  notion	  of	  risk	  as	  a	  
single-­‐dimensional	   measure.	   The	   output	   rows	   and	   columns	   then	   provide	   a	   contiguous	   and	   complete	  
partitioning	   of	   the	   risk	   space	   with	   respect	   to	   its	   two	   components	   of	   loss/harm	   and	   uncertainty.	   These	  
components	  are	  briefly	  described	  in	  the	  following	  sections.	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3.1 Loss	  
Loss	  must	  be	  defined	  with	  respect	  to	  an	  EOV,	  a	  property/attribute	  of	  that	  entity,	  and	  an	  associated	  scale	  
describing	  the	  level	  loss	  to	  the	  attribute	  (Clothier	  et	  al.	  2011).	  	  
The	   specification	   of	   what	   constitutes	   loss	   will	   also	   depend	   on	   which	   stakeholder	   is	   performing	   the	  
assessment.	   The	   “vector	   of	   loss”	   is	   the	   finite	   set	   of	   types	   of	   loss	   considered,	   which	   could	   include	   people,	  
buildings,	  flora	  and	  fauna,	  and	  less	  tangible	  EOV	  to	  society.	  In	  defining	  the	  vector	  of	  values,	  the	  comprehensive	  
management	  of	  the	  scenario	  may	  necessitate	  consideration	  of	  secondary	  hazards	  (e.g.,	  the	  ensuing	  collapse	  of	  
a	   building,	   bushfire,	   or	   release	   of	   environmental	   contaminants)	   that	  may	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   different	   EOV.	  
Under	   some	  circumstances	   the	  potential	   loss	   from	  secondary	  hazards	   could	  be	  greater	   than	   that	  associated	  
with	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  primary	  hazard.	  In	  addition,	  a	  single	  hazard	  may	  have	  an	  impact	  across	  a	  range	  of	  
EOV-­‐attributes.	  For	  example,	  for	  a	  large	  UAS,	  the	  primary	  attribute	  of	  concern	  is	  typically	  the	  potential	  physical	  
harm	  to	  a	  person	  or	  building.	  For	  a	  small	  UAS,	  striking	  a	  house	  may	  have	  a	  greater	  psychological	  impact	  on	  the	  
occupant	  than	  that	  of	  a	  physical	  impact	  on	  the	  occupant	  or	  the	  building	  itself.	  The	  appropriate	  management	  of	  
the	   UAS	   fleet	   may	   therefore	   need	   to	   consider	   a	   range	   of	   EOV	   and	   EOV-­‐attributes	   for	   which	   loss	   may	   be	  
registered	  (e.g.,	  for	  people	  this	  could	  include	  physical,	  psychological,	  or	  financial	  attributes).	  	  	  
Associated	  with	  each	  attribute	  is	  a	  continuous	  or	  discrete	  spectrum	  describing	  the	  degree	  of	  loss	  (Clothier	  
et	  al.	  2011).	  This	  spectrum	  may	  be	  expressed	  through	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  measures.	  A	  type	  of	  loss	  can	  
be	  defined	  independent	  of	  a	  particular	  hazard	  (e.g.,	  for	  physical	  harm	  to	  people	  this	  could	  be	  no	  injury,	  minor	  
injury,	  serious	  injury	  or	  fatality).	  The	  spectrum	  of	  loss	  should	  consider	  the	  potential	  loss	  to	  an	  individual	  EOV	  as	  
well	   that	   to	   applicable	   EOV	   groups	   (e.g.,	   for	   physical	   injury	   to	   people,	   a	   spectrum	  of	   loss	   could	   be	   defined	  
ranging	  from	  no	  injury	  to	  a	  single	  person	  through	  to	  multiple	  fatalities	  within	  a	  group	  of	  people).	  Society	  may	  
also	   place	   a	   higher	   value	   on	   certain	   sub-­‐types	   of	   EOV	   (e.g.,	   the	   distinction	   between	   first-­‐	   and	   third-­‐party	  
people	   and	   property).	   Society	   subsequently	   may	   assign	   a	   higher	   level	   of	   loss	   to	   these	   EOV,	   despite	   the	  
measure	  of	  the	  loss	  outcome	  (e.g.,	  a	  fatality)	  being	  the	  same.	  
3.2 Uncertainty	  
Klinke	  and	  Renn	  (2002)	  state	  that	  there	  is	  no	  established	  classification	  of	  uncertainty	  and	  that	  it	  is	  a	  topic	  
of	   major	   debate	   within	   the	   risk	   community.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   paper,	   the	   high-­‐level	   concept	   of	  
uncertainty	  is	  the	  state,	  even	  partial,	  of	  deficiency	  of	  information	  related	  to	  the	  understanding	  or	  knowledge	  
of	  a	  loss	  outcome,	  inclusive	  of	  all	  of	  its	  components	  and	  its	  component-­‐relationships	  [definition	  modified	  from	  
ISO	  Guide	  73	  (2009)].	  This	  definition	  encompasses	  uncertainty	  that	  arises	  through	  stochastic	  variation	  or	  a	  lack	  
of	  knowledge	  of	  the	  scenario	  leading	  to	  the	  loss	  outcome,	  the	  particular	  level	  of	  loss,	  and	  the	  likelihood	  of	  its	  
occurrence.	  
In	  a	  traditional	  risk	  matrix,	  the	  concept	  of	  uncertainty	  is	  narrowed	  to	  a	  measure	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  loss	  
event	   occurring.	   A	   range	   of	  measures	   can	   be	   used	   to	   describe	   potential,	   including	   probability	   (DoD	   2000),	  
likelihood	   (ISO	   2009),	   frequency	   (Cox	   2008),	   and	   expected	   value.	   These	   measures	   can	   be	   expressed	   on	  
qualitative	   or	   quantitative	   scales.	   For	   example,	   MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D	   defines	   five	   probability	   levels:	   improbable,	  
remote,	   occasional,	   probable,	   and	   frequent	   [refer	   to	   Table	   A-­‐II	   of	   DoD	   (2000)].	   To	   generalise,	   and	  without	  
prescribing	   the	  particular	  method	  of	  assessment,	   this	  dimension	  can	  be	   thought	  of	  as	  a	  scale	  describing	   the	  
potential	  for	  realising	  loss.	  
3.3 Risk	  
The	  cells	  of	  the	  matrix	  represent	  an	  assessment	  of	  the	  risk	  for	  a	  given	  scenario.	  Although	  widely	  used,	  we	  
argue	  that	  the	  quantitative	  assessment	  of	  risk	  is	  not	  the	  arithmetic	  multiplication	  of	  loss	  and	  uncertainty.	  An	  
assessment	  of	  risk	  is	  the	  Cartesian	  product	  of	  a	  level	  of	   loss	  (i.e.,	  a	  given	  column)	  by	  a	  degree	  of	  uncertainty	  
(i.e.,	  a	  given	  row),	  and	  the	  output	   is	   the	  set	  of	  all	  ordered	  pairs	  of	   the	  elements	   from	  the	  two	  sets	   (i.e.,	   the	  
ordered	   set	   of	   the	   pair-­‐wise	   combination	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   the	   components	   of	   risk:	   those	   of	   loss	   and	  
uncertainty).	  Thus,	  an	  assessment	  of	  risk	  may	  be	  thought	  of	  as	  a	  mapping	  within	  a	  multidimensional	  space	  (the	  
generation	  of	  the	  cells	  of	  the	  matrix).	  	  
A	  particular	  assessment	  of	  the	  risk	  may	  be	  compared	  against	  risk	  criteria	  or	  ranked	  alongside	  assessments	  
made	   for	   other	   scenarios.	   Systematic	   decisions	   may	   then	   be	   made	   as	   to	   the	   setting	   of	   controls	   and	   the	  
appropriate	   treatment	  of	   the	  risks	   to	  ensure	  criteria	  are	  satisfied	  and	  that	   risks	  are	  managed	  equitably	  over	  
the	  industry	  (i.e.,	  across	  all	  scenarios).	  	  
To	  summarise	  in	  the	  context	  of	  developing	  an	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  for	  UAS,	  a	  risk	  matrix	  
provides	   a	   simple	   and	   accepted	   tool	   for	   the	   systematic	   assessment,	   comparison	   and	   ranking	   of	   risks	   (e.g.,	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those	  risks	  associated	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  different	  types	  of	  UAS	  over	  inhabited	  areas).	  This	  information	  may	  
then	  be	  used	  to	  guide	  the	  setting	  of	  risk	  controls	  (i.e.,	  the	  tailoring	  of	  airworthiness	  regulations)	  to	  ensure	  risk	  
criteria	   (e.g.,	   the	   ELOS	   objective)	   are	  met.	   Thus,	   it	   is	   the	   hypothesis	   of	   this	   paper	   that	   a	   risk	  matrix	   could	  
provide	  the	  guiding	  principles	  necessary	  to	  structure	  an	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  for	  civil	  UAS.	  	  
3.4 Application	  to	  the	  Development	  of	  Part	  21	  Regulations	  for	  UAS	  
A	  risk	  matrix	  is	  used	  as	  inspiration	  for	  the	  structuring	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  and	  the	  
resultant	   airworthiness	   certification	  matrix	   (ACM)	   is	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	  3.	   The	   components	   (axes,	   cells	   and	  
cell-­‐values)	  of	  the	  ACM	  are:	  
	  
1. Type	  category	  of	  UAS	  (the	  columns)	  –	  This	  dimension	  of	  the	  ACM	  is	  defined	  based	  on	  a	  discrete,	  
continuous	   and	   increasing	   scale	   of	   loss	   (or	   consequence).	   Each	   type	   category	   thus	   represents	   a	  
grouping	   of	   UAS	   where,	   given	   the	   occurrence	   of	   an	   unrecoverable,	   flight-­‐critical	   failure	   and	  
independent	  of	  any	  particular	  area	  over-­‐flown,	  the	  potential	  magnitude	  of	  the	  resultant	  damage	  
that	   could	   be	   caused	   to	   EOV	   over-­‐flown	   is	   of	   a	   similar	   magnitude.	   An	   example	   of	   such	   a	  
categorisation	  is	  provided	  by	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2010);	  
	  
2. Category	  of	  operational	  environment	  (the	  rows)	  –	  This	  dimension	  of	  the	  ACM	  is	  defined	  based	  on	  a	  
discrete,	   continuous	   ranking	   of	   potential	   for	   realising	   a	   degree	   of	   loss.	   Each	   category	   of	  
operational	  environment	  thus	  represents	  a	  grouping	  of	  operational	  areas	  where	  the	  potential	  for	  
realising	  loss,	  given	  a	  UAS	  impacting	  the	  area,	  is	  of	  a	  similar	  magnitude;	  
	  
3. Operational	  scenarios	  (the	  cells)	  –	  This	  component	  of	  the	  ACM	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  assessment	  of	  
risk	  within	  a	  risk	  matrix,	  which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  Cartesian	  product	  formed	  over	  the	  sets	  of	  row	  
and	  column	  elements.	  The	  Cartesian	  product	  is	  used	  to	  construct	  a	  matrix	  with	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  
cells	   (q),	  determined	  by	  the	  number	  of	  rows	  (m)	  multiplied	  by	  the	  number	  of	  columns	  (n).	  Thus,	  
each	  cell	  represents	  a	  unique	  operational	  scenario	  defined	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  specific	  UAS-­‐
type	  category	  together	  with	  a	  specific	  category	  of	  the	  operational	  environment;	  and	  
	  
4. Airworthiness	   certification	   categories	   (the	   values	   assigned	   to	   the	   cells)	   –	   This	   component	   is	  
determined	  first	  by	  an	  assessment	  of	   the	  risks	  associated	  with	  a	  given	  operational	  scenario	   (i.e.,	  
the	   given	   cell)	   and,	   then,	   an	   assignment	   of	   the	   operational	   scenario	   to	   one	   of	   r	   certification	  
categories,	  based	  on	  this	  assessment,	  where	  1	  ≤	  r	  ≤	  q.	  
	  
In	  general,	  and	  by	  virtue	  of	   the	  definition	  of	   the	  values	  assigned	  to	  the	  axes,	   the	   level	  of	  risk	  associated	  
with	  each	  scenario	  (and	  subsequently	  the	  certification	  categories	  assigned	  to	  them)	  defined	  in	  the	  lower-­‐right	  
quadrant	   of	   the	   ACM	   is	   higher	   than	   the	   levels	   of	   risk	   associated	   with	   those	   scenarios/categories	   situated	  
towards	  the	  upper-­‐left	  quadrant.	  
In	   order	   to	  map	   the	   type	   of	   UAS	   and	   operational	   area	   to	   the	   spectra	   of	   increasing	   loss	   and	   potential,	  
respectively,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  define	  a	  common	  set	  of	  hazards	  and	  EOV.	  As	  will	  be	  described	  in	  the	  following	  
sections,	   the	   condition	   for	   independence	   between	   the	   rows	   and	   columns	   can	   be	   maintained	   through	  
conditional	  modelling.	  
In	  summary,	  the	  ACM	  provides	  a	  systematic	  method	  for	  partitioning	  the	  numerous	  possible	  combinations	  
of	  UAS	   types	  and	  operations	   into	  a	   finite	  number	  of	   scenarios.	  Certification	   categories	  are	   then	  assigned	   to	  
each	  scenario	  (cell)	  based	  on	  the	  assessed	  levels	  of	  risk.	  
	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  13	  of	  29	  
	  
Figure	  3	  –	  Illustration	  of	  an	  airworthiness	  certification	  matrix	  for	  civil	  UAS	  (defined	  for	  a	  given	  type	  of	  
loss	  outcome	  and	  a	  given	  stakeholder	  perspective)	  
	  
3.4.1 UAS-­‐Type	  Categories	  (The	  Columns)	  
As	   illustrated	   in	  Figure	  3,	  each	  of	   the	  n	   columns	  of	   the	  ACM	  represents	  a	   finite	  UAS-­‐type	  category.	   In	  a	  
traditional	   risk	  matrix,	   this	   dimension	   represents	   a	   scale	   of	   increasing	   loss,	   consequence	   or	   harm	   resulting	  
from	  a	  mishap.	  For	  example,	  Table	  A-­‐I	  in	  MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D	  (DoD	  2000)	  defines	  four	  levels	  of	  severity:	  negligible,	  
marginal,	   critical,	   catastrophic.	   The	   basis	   for	   defining	   UAS-­‐type	   categories	   is	   a	   spectrum	   describing	   the	  
potential	  magnitude	  of	  loss	  that	  the	  different	  types	  of	  UAS	  may	  cause.	  This	  spectrum	  is	  one	  of	  conditional	  and	  
hypothetical	  loss	  that	  is	  independent	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  particular	  operational	  area	  (i.e.,	  preserving	  the	  
orthogonality	  of	  the	  two	  component	  axes	  of	  the	  matrix).	  More	  simply	  put:	  	  
	  
Given	   the	  occurrence	  of	   an	  unrecoverable	   flight-­‐critical	   failure,	  what	   is	   the	  maximum	  degree	  of	   loss	   the	  
UAS	  could	  cause,	  irrespective	  of	  where	  it	  crashed?	  
	  	  
Each	  type	  category	  subsequently	  describes	  a	  grouping	  of	  UAS	  where	  the	  magnitude	  of	  potential	  loss	  due	  
to	  a	  mishap	  is	  within	  some	  pre-­‐defined	  bounds,	  irrespective	  of	  where	  the	  UAS	  is	  operated.	  The	  type	  categories	  
must	   be	   disjoint	   (i.e.,	   provide	   an	   unambiguous	   classification	   of	   UAS)	   and	   together	   provide	   complete	   and	  
continuous	  coverage	  of	  the	  range	  of	  plausible	   loss	   (i.e.,	  cover	  the	  spectrum	  of	  UAS	  types	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  
cause	  loss).	  The	  fundamental	  concept	  of	  loss	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  categorisation	  may	  be	  observed	  in	  current	  CPA	  type	  
categories	  (i.e.,	  the	  classification	  criterion	  of	  the	  number	  of	  people	  onboard);	  however,	  this	  basis	  is	  not	  applied	  
consistently	  across	  the	  CPA	  categorisation	  scheme.	  Thus,	  pivotal	  to	  the	  specification	  of	  type	  categories	  for	  use	  
within	   the	  proposed	  ACM	   is	   an	  understanding	  of	   the	  potential	   types	  and	   levels	  of	   loss	   associated	  with	  UAS	  
operations.	  
As	  described	  in	  §3.1,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  consider	  more	  than	  just	  the	  potential	  loss	  to	  people.	  With	  
respect	  to	  UAS	  operations	  over	   inhabited	  areas,	  the	  spectrum	  should	  cover	  the	  range	  of	  potential	   loss	  to	  an	  
individual	   EOV	   as	  well	   that	   to	   applicable	   EOV	   groups	   (e.g.,	   for	   physical	   injury	   to	   people,	   a	   spectrum	  of	   loss	  
could	   be	   defined	   ranging	   from	   no	   injury	   to	   a	   single	   person	   through	   to	  multiple	   fatalities	  within	   a	   group	   of	  
people).	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3.4.1.1 Categorisation	  of	  Loss	  
Proceeding	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  a	  workable	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  requires	  some	  degree	  of	  
categorisation	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  UAS	  types	  to	  be	  operated,	  then	  a	  mechanism	  for	  discretising	  the	  spectra	  of	  
loss	  associated	  with	  this	  diversity	  is	  needed.	  	  
Predominantly,	   the	   process	   used	   in	   the	   specification	   of	   existing	   categorisation	   schemes	   has	   been	  
subjective,	   providing	   little	   or	   no	   objective	   justification	   for	   the	   particular	   partitioning	   chosen.	   Often	   these	  
schemes	  reflect	  the	  needs	  (and	  commercial	  desires)	  of	  the	  particular	  stakeholders	  involved.	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  
(2009)	   subjectively	   assign	   categories	   based	   on	   the	   “natural	   classification”	   observed	   between	  MTOW	   and	   a	  
derived	  measure	  of	  reliability.	  Given	  the	  potentially	  significant	   influence	  type	  categories	  will	  have	   in	  shaping	  
the	   future	  of	   the	  UAS	   industry,	   a	   transparent	   and	  defensible	   strategy	   for	   determining	   a	   suitable	  number	  of	  
categories	   and	   the	   classification	   criteria	   that	   define	   each	   category	   is	   needed.	  One	   such	  method,	   concerned	  
with	  the	  risk	  of	  human	  casualties	  is	  discussed	  by	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  
Typically,	  categorisation	  processes	  seek	  to	  collapse	  the	  distinct	  spectra	  of	   loss	  outcomes	  (as	  described	  in	  
the	  previous	  section)	  into	  a	  single	  loss	  dimension	  for	  which	  discrete	  categories	  are	  then	  defined.	  For	  example,	  
the	   loss	   dimension	   defined	   in	   MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D	   (DoD	   2000)	   includes	   the	   distinct	   loss	   outcomes	   to	   people,	  
property	  and	  the	  environment.	  The	  combination	  of	  these	  outcomes	  onto	  a	  single	  dimension	  does	  not	  preserve	  
the	   distinct	   likelihood	   of	   realising	   each	   individual	   loss	   outcome.	   In	   addition,	   such	   processes	   represent	   a	  
subjective	  judgement	  on	  the	  comparative	  value	  that	  stakeholders	  place	  on	  the	  different	  EOV	  [e.g.,	  in	  MIL-­‐STD-­‐
882D	   (DoD	   2000)	   the	  mishap	   severity	   category	   of	   catastrophic	   equates	   the	   loss	   of	   a	   human	   life	   to	   that	   of	  
permanent	  total	  disability,	  to	  irreversible	  environmental	  damage,	  and	  to	  the	  loss	  of	  more	  than	  US$1	  million].	  	  
In	  contrast,	   the	  approach	  proposed	   in	   this	  paper	   seeks	   to	  preserve	   the	  separate	  dimensions	  of	   loss	  and	  
acknowledge	  subjectivity	  in	  the	  specification	  of	  loss.	  The	  matrix	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3	  is	  defined	  for	  a	  particular	  
stakeholder	  perspective	  and	  type	  of	  loss	  outcome;	  however,	  the	  dimension	  of	  loss	  may	  also	  be	  defined	  by	  the	  
distinct	   spectra	   of	   loss	   outcomes	   specified	   by	   each	   individual	   stakeholder	   involved	   in	   the	   decision-­‐making	  
process.	  The	  result,	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4,	  is	  a	  set	  of	  matrices	  describing	  the	  loss	  outcomes	  of	  concern	  for	  each	  
particular	  stakeholder.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4	  –	  Preservation	  of	  the	  different	  types	  of	  loss	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3.4.1.2 Summary	  
Currently,	   there	   is	   no	   consensus	   on	   the	   definition	   of	   type	   categories	   for	   UAS	   (DeGarmo	   2004;	  
Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	  2008b).	  Many	  of	  the	  existing	  schemes	  have	  not	  been	  defined	  specifically	  for	  the	  purposes	  
of	  certification.	  For	  a	  comprehensive	   review	  of	  UAS	  categorisation	  schemes	  refer	   to	  Nas	   (2011).	   In	  addition,	  
there	  is	  no	  consensus	  on	  a	  process	  for	  defining	  a	  suitable	  scheme	  (DeGarmo	  2004).	  As	  described	  by	  DeGarmo	  
(2004),	   consensus	   on	   a	   particular	   UAS-­‐type-­‐categorisation	   scheme	   is	   fundamental	   to	   the	   progress	   of	  
regulations.	  	  
Under	   the	   proposed	   ACM,	   a	   type-­‐categorisation	   scheme	   for	   UAS	   should	   be	   defined	   based	   on	   the	  
qualitative	  or	  quantitative	  specification	  of	  the	  potential	  levels	  of	  loss	  to	  people,	  property,	  and	  other	  EOV	  over-­‐
flown.	   To	   preserve	   the	   generality	   of	   the	   proposed	   ACM	   framework,	   the	   vector	   of	   values	   has	   not	   been	  
prescribed.	  Instead	  (and	  as	  discussed	  in	  Sections	  §3.1,	  §3.4.1	  and	  §3.4.1.1)	  the	  specification	  of	  type	  categories	  
for	   UAS	  may	   need	   to	   consider	   a	   range	   of	   loss	   outcomes	   in	   order	   to	   appropriately	  manage	   the	   diverse	   risk	  
profile	  associated	  with	  UAS	  and	  their	  operations.	  
Finally,	   there	   will	   be	   factors	   that	   may	   not	   be	   directly	   related	   to	   loss	   that	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   into	  
consideration.	  For	  example,	  it	  may	  be	  practical	  to	  distinguish	  between	  rotorcraft	  UAS	  and	  fixed-­‐wing	  UAS	  (as	  is	  
done	  in	  the	  airworthiness	  framework	  for	  CPA)	  due	  to	  the	  unique	  aspects	  of	  each	  type	  and	  the	  availability	  of	  
existing	  low-­‐level	  codes	  of	  regulation	  that	  could	  be	  applied.	  Such	  factors	  are	  related	  to	  the	  context	  of	  practical	  
regulation	  and	  should	  be	  second-­‐order	  considerations	  in	  the	  refinement	  of	  the	  type-­‐categorisation	  scheme.	  	  
The	  above	   sections	  briefly	   introduce	   some	  of	   the	   issues	   that	  need	   to	  be	   considered	   in	   the	  definition	  of	  
type	  categories	  for	  UAS.	  A	  suitable	  process	  for	  defining	  these	  categories	  is	  described	  by	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2010).	  
3.4.2 Operational	  Categories	  (The	  Rows)	  
As	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   3,	   each	   row	   of	   the	   ACM	   represents	   one	   of	   m	   categories	   of	   operational	  
environment.	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  operational	  categories	  can	  be	  considered	  as	  representative	  of	  a	  spectrum	  
of	   increasing	   potential	   for	   loss	   that	   is	   determined	   independent	   of	   the	   characteristics	   of	   any	   particular	   type	  
category	  of	  UAS.	  More	  simply	  put:	  
	  
Irrespective	  of	  the	  type	  of	  UAS	  that	  comes	  to	  earth,	  how	  susceptible	  is	  an	  area	  to	  experiencing	  loss?	  
	  
Like	   the	   specification	   of	   type	   categories,	   the	   categories	   of	   operational	   environments	   should	   be	   disjoint	  
(i.e.,	  provide	  an	  unambiguous	  classification	  of	   the	  different	   types	  of	  areas	  over-­‐flown)	  and	   together	  provide	  
complete	  and	  continuous	  coverage	  of	  the	  range	  of	  possible	  areas	  over-­‐flown	  (i.e.,	  cover	  the	  entire	  spectrum	  of	  
operational	   areas).	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   independence	   between	   the	   specification	   of	   operational	   and	  
type	  categories	  (the	  two	  component-­‐dimensions	  of	  the	  ACM)	  is	  maintained,	  as	  the	  assessment	  is	  for	  all	  types	  
of	   loss	   not	   specific	   to	   a	   particular	   type	   category	   of	  UAS.	   In	   essence,	   the	   operational	   categories	   are	   defined	  
based	  on	  the	  “susceptibility”	  of	  the	  area	  to	  loss	  given	  a	  UAS	  mishap.	  
3.4.2.1 Categorisation	  of	  Operational	  Environments	  
Under	   the	   ACM	   approach,	   the	   different	   operational	   environments	   need	   to	   be	   mapped	   to	   a	   scale	   of	  
increasing	  potential	  for	  harm	  independent	  of	  the	  particular	  type	  of	  UAS	  flying	  overhead.	  The	  characterisation	  
of	   this	   axis	   of	   the	   ACM	   is	   a	   complex	   problem	   requiring	   knowledge	   of	   the	   susceptibility,	   number	   and	  
distribution	  of	  different	  types	  of	  EOV	  for	  which	  loss	  could	  be	  registered.	  Once	  mapped	  to	  a	  common	  scale	  of	  
potential,	  the	  operational	  environments	  can	  be	  grouped	  into	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  categories.	  
The	   primary	   EOV	   of	   concern	   with	   respect	   to	   safety	   is	   people,	   and	   this	   provides	   the	   basis	   for	   existing	  
qualitative	  categorisation	  schemes	  identified	  in	  aviation	  literature.	  CASA	  describes	  a	  populous	  area	  as	  an	  area	  
of:	  
	  
…sufficient	   density	   of	   population	   for	   some	   aspect	   of	   the	   operation,	   or	   some	   event	   that	   might	   happen	  
during	  the	  operation	  (in	  particular,	  a	  fault	  in,	  or	  failure	  of,	  the	  aircraft	  or	  rocket)	  to	  pose	  an	  unreasonable	  risk	  
to	  the	  life,	  safety	  or	  property	  of	  somebody	  who	  is	  in	  the	  area	  but	  is	  not	  connected	  with	  the	  operation.	  
CASR	  Part	  101.025	  (CASA	  2004)	  
	  
Federal	  Aviation	  Regulations	  (FAR	  2009)	  and	  supporting	  material	  yield	  numerous	  terms	  for	  the	  description	  
of	  operational	  areas:	  densely	  populated,	  congested,	  other	  than	  congested,	  unpopulated,	  sparsely	  populated,	  
and	  over	  water.	  However,	  no	  prescriptive	  definitions	  are	  provided.	  The	  RTCA	  Special	  Committee	  203	  (SC-­‐203)	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for	   Unmanned	   Systems	   defines	   four	   qualitative	   categories	   for	   the	   classification	   of	   operational	   areas,	  
specifically:	  
	  
1. Densely	   populated	   –	   described	   as	   urban	   and	   suburban	   areas,	   particularly	   with	   residential	  
developments.	  	  
2. Sparsely	   populated	   –	   generally	   rural	   areas	   and	   agricultural	   regions	  where	   individual	   homes	   are	  
separated	  by	  large	  tracts	  of	  land.	  
3. Unpopulated	  –	  uninhabited	  areas.	  
4. Open-­‐air	  assemblies	  of	  people	  –	  described	  as	  outdoor	  gatherings	  without	  overhead	  shelter.	  
DO-­‐304,	  p.I-­‐18,	  RTCA	  (2007)	  
	  
Prevalent	   factors	   in	   the	  above	  definitions	  are	   the	  distribution	  of	   the	  population	  within	   the	  area	  and	  the	  
degree	  of	  sheltering	  provided.	  Thus	  the	  simplest	  specification	  of	  operational	  areas	  could	  be:	  
	  
1. Populated	  –	  given	  a	  UAS	  impacting	  the	  area,	  the	  potential	   for	   loss	   is	  greater	  than	  zero.	  E.g.,	   this	  
would	  be	  any	  area	  where	  an	  EOV	  is	  present.	  
	  
2. Not	  populated	  –	  given	  a	  UAS	  impacting	  the	  area,	  the	  potential	  for	  loss	  is	  approaching	  zero.	  E.g.,	  a	  
sanitised	  test	  range,	  a	  desert,	  or	  the	  high	  seas.	  
	  
The	  alternative	  approach	  is	  to	  not	  explicitly	  classify	  operational	  areas	  into	  a	  predefined	  set	  of	  categories.	  
As	   illustrated	   by	   Weibel	   and	   Hansman	   (2004),	   Clothier	   et	   al.	   (2007),	   and	   Dalamagkidis	   et	   al.	   (2009),	   it	   is	  
possible	   to	  use	  population	  and	  other	   geographical	   information	   system	   (GIS)	   databases	   to	   gain	   a	   continuous	  
quantitative	   and	   geo-­‐referenced	   characterisation	   of	   the	   distribution	   of	   an	   EOV	   for	   every	   operational	   area	  
considered.	   The	   definition	   and	   number	   of	   operational	   areas	   is	   instead	   determined	   by	   the	   resolution	   of	   the	  
data	  available	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  subjectively	  defined	  categories.	  	  
Defining	  a	  greater	  number	  of	  categories	  provides	  greater	  resolution	  of	  the	  diverse	  areas	  available	  for	  UAS	  
operations.	  However,	  there	  are	  disadvantages	  in	  having	  a	  large	  number	  of	  operational	  categories.	  Under	  the	  
proposed	   framework,	  UAS	   issued	  with	   a	   COA	   in	   a	   given	   airworthiness	   category	   cannot	   be	   flown	  over	   areas	  
where	   a	   higher	   category	   of	   airworthiness	   certification	   is	   required.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   “pseudo”	   airways	   or	  
pockets	  of	  UAS	  activity	  may	  eventuate	  (i.e.,	  similar	  to	  how	  concentrations	  of	  VFR	  air	  traffic	  can	  develop	  due	  to	  
the	   distribution	   of	   controlled	   airspace).	   The	   greater	   the	   number	   of	   operational	   categories	   defined,	   the	  
narrower	  and	  the	  denser	  these	  airways	  and	  pockets	  of	  UAS	  operations	  can	  become.	   In	  addition,	   the	  greater	  
the	  number	  of	  categories	  defined,	  the	  more	  sensitive	  the	  qualitative	  schemes	  are	  to	  diverse	  interpretation	  and	  
hence	   the	   greater	   the	   need	   for	   a	   quantified	   categorisation	   scheme.	   A	   greater	   number	   of	   operational	  
categories	  can	  also	  permit	  UAS	  operations	  over	  areas	  where	  previously	  they	  were	  prohibited	  from	  flying	  (i.e.,	  
through	  the	  specification	  of	  sub-­‐categories	  within	  the	  existing	  category	  of	  “populous	  area”).	  Therefore,	  careful	  
consideration	  should	  be	  given	  to	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  operational	  categories,	  as	  they	  can	  influence	  how	  the	  
airspace	  system	  is	  used	  by	  UAS.	  	  
Finally,	  a	  practical	  implementation	  of	  the	  airworthiness	  framework	  requires	  the	  operational	  categories	  to	  
be	  identified	  in	  navigation	  charts	  (e.g.,	  similar	  to	  the	  depiction	  of	  built-­‐up	  areas	  in	  CPA	  navigation	  charts).	  For	  
UAS,	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  develop	  separate	  charts	  representing	  the	  category	  of	  operational	  area	  assigned	  
to	   geographic	   regions.	   The	   more	   categories	   there	   are,	   the	   more	   complicated	   such	   charts	   would	   become.	  
Hence,	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  specify	  the	  optimal	  number	  of	  operational	  categories	  that	  adequately	  encapsulates	  
the	  diversity	  of	  operational	  areas	  and,	  in	  turn,	  provides	  a	  workable	  regulatory	  outcome.	  
Finally,	  there	  a	  number	  of	  other	  factors	  influencing	  the	  potential	  for	  causing	  harm	  to	  EOV	  and	  hence	  the	  
categorisation	  of	  operational	  environments.	  These	  include,	  for	  example,	  factors	  influencing	  the	  response	  of	  an	  
individual	  EOV	  to	  a	  mishap	  (e.g.,	   the	  demographic	  of	  the	  population:	  age	  and	  health,	  etc.),	   the	  tendency	  for	  
clustering	  within	  a	  population	  of	  EOV,	  which	  is	  needed	  to	  characterise	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  mishap	  resulting	  in	  
multiple	   causalities,	   and	   sheltering	   [e.g.,	   the	   population-­‐sheltering	   models	   used	   in	   the	   Columbia	   accident	  
investigation	   (Lin	   et	   al.	   2003)].	   The	   susceptibility	   and	   hence	   potential	   for	   an	   operational	   environment	   to	  
experience	  loss	  could	  also	  change	  with	  the	  time	  of	  day	  (e.g.,	  due	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  number	  and	  distribution	  of	  
people	  exposed).	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3.4.2.2 Summary	  
Under	   the	  proposed	   framework	   the	  categorisation	  of	  operational	  environments	   should	  be	  based	  on	   the	  
potential	   for	   the	   realisation	  of	   loss	  given	  a	  UAS	   impacting	   that	  area.	  As	  described	  above,	   a	   range	  of	   factors	  
characterise	   the	   conditional	   potential	   for	   loss	   in	   a	   given	   environment.	   A	   method	   for	   categorising	   these	  
operational	  environments	   is	  also	  needed.	  The	  specification	  of	   these	  categories	   requires	   the	  consideration	  of	  
broader	   issues	   relating	   their	   potential	   impact	   on	   the	   operation	   of	   UAS	   and	   other	   airspace	   users	   and	   the	  
practical	  issues	  associated	  with	  the	  promulgation	  and	  management	  of	  regulations.	  
3.5 The	  Operational	  Scenarios	  (The	  Cells)	  	  
Each	  cell	  of	  the	  ACM	  describes	  a	  unique	  risk	  scenario	  defined	  by	  the	  combination	  of	  a	  specific	  category	  of	  
operational	   area	   (a	   row)	   with	   a	   specific	   UAS-­‐type	   category	   (a	   column).	   The	   complete	   set	   of	   q	   operational	  
scenarios	  is	  defined	  by	  the	  Cartesian	  product	  of	  the	  two	  component	  axes	  of	  loss	  and	  uncertainty.	  	  
The	  matrix-­‐based	  approach	  reduces	  the	  continuous	  spectrum	  of	  scenarios	  to	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  discrete,	  
contiguous	   and	   organised	   categories.	   The	   structure	   of	   the	   matrix	   provides	   a	   simple	   mechanism	   for	  
systematically	  relating	  the	  operational	  scenarios	  to	  the	  fundamental	  components	  of	  civil	  aviation	  regulations	  
(i.e.,	   regulations	   pertaining	   to	   the	   design,	   maintenance	   and	   manufacture	   of	   aircraft,	   and	   the	   regulations	  
pertaining	  to	  the	  operation	  of	  an	  aircraft).	  
The	   next	   step	   in	   the	   process	   is	   to	   assign	   each	   operational	   scenario	   to	   an	   airworthiness	   certification	  
category.	  Diagrammatically,	  and	  referring	  to	  Figure	  3,	  this	  is	  the	  process	  of	  determining	  the	  colour	  of	  each	  cell	  
within	  the	  matrix.	  
3.6 The	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Categories	  (The	  Cell-­‐Values)	  
Risk	   is	  often	  expressed	  as	  the	  Cartesian	  product	  of	   its	  components	  of	   loss	  and	  the	  potential	   for	  realising	  
each	  specified	  loss.	  Each	  cell	  may	  be	  characterised	  by:	  
	  
1. a	  set	  of	  loss	  outcomes	  (scenarios),	  and	  	  
2. an	  associated	  set	  of	  measures	  describing	  the	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  realisation	  of	  these	  loss	  outcomes.	  	  
	  
These	  assessments	  may	  be	  quantitative	  or	  qualitative	  and	  may	  be	  made	  for	  each	  combination	  of	  UAS-­‐type	  
and	  operational	   category	   (i.e.,	   for	   each	  operational	   scenario	  defined	  by	   the	   cells	   of	   the	  matrix).	   Typically,	   a	  
single	  dimension	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  loss	  and	  uncertainty	  components	  of	  the	  measure	  of	  risk.	  For	  example,	  
Table	   A-­‐IV	   in	   MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D	   (DoD	   2000)	   defines	   a	   finite	   qualitative	   scale	   for	   assessing	   risk:	   low,	   medium,	  
serious,	   and	   high.	   Quantified	   measures	   (e.g.,	   the	   expected	   frequency)	   are	   also	   used	   to	   reduce	   the	   multi-­‐
dimensional	  measurement	  problem	  to	  that	  of	  a	  single	  measure.	  A	  common	  example	  is	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  
casualties	  per	   flight	  hour,	  as	  used	   in	  Grimsley	   (2004),	  Weibel	  and	  Hansman	   (2004),	  and	  Clothier	  and	  Walker	  
(2006).	  However,	   as	   described	  by	   Paté-­‐Cornell	   (1994)	   and	   the	  Range	  Commanders	   Council	   (RCC,	   2007),	   the	  
effective	  management	  of	  the	  risks	  should	  include	  measures	  of	  the:	  
	  
1. individual	  risk	  (IR)	  to	  ensure	  that	  no	  individual	  entity	  is	  disproportionately	  exposed	  (Jongejan	  et	  al.	  
2006);	  
2. collective	   risk	   (CR)	   to	  ensure	   the	   levels	  of	   risk,	  when	  aggregated	  across	   the	  entire	  population	  of	  
entities,	  are	  managed	  to	  an	  acceptable	  level;	  and	  	  
3. societal	  risk	  (SR)	  (Jongejan	  et	  al.	  2006),	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  catastrophic	  risk	  (RCC	  2007),	  to	  reflect	  
society’s	  adversity	  to	  mishaps	  that	  result	  in	  a	  larger	  magnitude	  of	  consequence.	  	  
	  
Each	  operational	  scenario	  then	  needs	  to	  be	  assigned	  to	  a	  certification	  category.	  As	  discussed	  previously,	  
this	  assignment	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  levels	  of	  risk	  determined	  for	  each	  operational	  scenario.	  This	  ensures	  
that	  operational	  scenarios	   that	  present	  comparable	   levels	  of	   risk	  are	  required	  to	  demonstrate	  a	  comparable	  
level	  of	  airworthiness	  (i.e.,	  are	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  body	  of	  airworthiness	  regulations	  and	  standards).	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  this	  assignment	  process	  is	  to	  determine	  the	  number	  of	  certification	  categories	  required,	  r.	  
The	   minimum	   number	   of	   airworthiness	   categories	   is	   one.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   where	   the	   same	   category	   of	  
airworthiness	   is	   assigned	   to	   all	   operational	   scenarios	   and	   represents	   the	   undesirable	   “one-­‐size-­‐fits-­‐all”	  
regulatory	  approach.	  In	  effect,	  this	  approach	  prescribes	  the	  same	  level	  of	  airworthiness	  regulation	  irrespective	  
of	   the	  degree	  of	   loss	   a	  UAS	   is	   capable	  of	   causing	   and	   irrespective	  of	  whether	   EOV	  are	  exposed	  or	  not.	   The	  
maximum	  number	  of	   airworthiness	   categories	   is	   determined	  by	   the	  dimensions	   of	   the	   airworthiness	  matrix	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(i.e.,	  q).	  The	  more	  airworthiness	  categories	  defined,	  the	  more	  tailored	  and	  flexible	  the	  airworthiness	  regulatory	  
framework	  is	  in	  its	  management	  of	  the	  diversity	  of	  UAS	  and	  their	  operations.	  Standards	  and	  regulations	  must	  
be	   defined	   for	   each	   airworthiness	   category;	   hence,	   the	   greater	   the	   number	   of	   categories,	   the	   greater	   the	  
regulatory	  development	  task	  and	  the	  more	  difficult	  it	  becomes	  to	  manage.	  	  
To	   summarise,	   there	   is	   no	   ideal	   number	   of	   categories;	   it	   will	   depend	   on	   a	   number	   of	   trade-­‐offs	   as	  
identified	  above.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  many	  subjective	  issues	  specific	  to	  the	  context	  of	  the	  promulgation	  of	  a	  
practical	   and	  workable	   regulatory	   framework	   that	  will	   influence	   the	   setting	   of	   the	  number	   of	   airworthiness	  
categories.	  A	  process	  is	  then	  needed	  to	  assign	  each	  operational	  scenario	  to	  the	  airworthiness	  categories.	  	  
3.6.1 Assigning	  Airworthiness	  Categories	  	  
The	  basic	  principle	  for	  assigning	  airworthiness	  categories	  is	  to	  determine	  which	  cells	  of	  the	  airworthiness	  
matrix	  pose	  a	  comparable	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  to	  then	  group	  these	  into	  a	  single	  airworthiness	  category	  so	  that	  a	  
consistent	  level	  of	  regulation	  may	  be	  applied.	  	  
A	   risk	   matrix	   [e.g.,	   Table	   A-­‐III	   of	   MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D	   (DoD	   2000)]	   provides	   one	   method	   for	   mapping	   an	  
operational	  scenario	  with	  a	  given	  “mishap	  severity”	  (Table	  A-­‐I)	  and	  a	  given	  “mishap	  probability”	  (Table	  A-­‐I)	  to	  a	  
“risk-­‐assessment	  value”	  (A-­‐IV).	  For	  example:	  a	  mishap	  of	  catastrophic	  severity	  that	  is	  probable	  is	  assessed	  as	  a	  
high	  risk	   (DoD	  2000).	  Each	  operational	  scenario	  within	   the	  ACM	  with	  a	  comparable	   risk	  assessment	   (e.g.,	  all	  
those	  cells	  assigned	  as	  being	  low	  risk)	  could	  then	  be	  assigned	  to	  the	  same	  certification	  category	  (e.g.,	  Cert	  1),	  
and	   so	   forth	   for	   all	   other	   levels	   defined	   by	   the	   qualitative	   scale	   describing	   the	   risk-­‐assessment	   value	   (DoD	  
2000).	  For	  quantitative	   risk	  assessments	  presented	  on	  a	  continuous	  scale,	  one	  approach	   is	   to	   try	   to	  observe	  
natural	  breakpoints	  within	  the	  assessments	  of	  risk	  and	  to	  use	  these	  breakpoints	  to	  delineate	  the	  airworthiness	  
categories	  (e.g.,	  mathematical	  clustering	  approaches).	  The	  process	  is	  complete	  when	  all	  operational	  scenarios	  
(i.e.,	  cells)	  within	  the	  matrix	  have	  been	  assigned	  to	  one	  of	  the	  r	  airworthiness	  categories.	  
Given	   the	  mapping	  of	   each	   cell	   of	   the	  matrix	   to	   a	   particular	   airworthiness	   category,	   the	   final	   step	   is	   to	  
tailor	  regulations	  to	  each	  category.	  
3.7 Tailoring	  of	  Regulations	  	  
The	  primary	  purpose	  of	  safety	  regulations	   is	  to	  mandate	  controls	  that	  ensure	  that	  risk	   is	  managed	  to	  an	  
acceptable	   level.	   Under	   the	   ELOS	   objective,	   the	   tailoring	   of	  UAS	   airworthiness	   regulations	   is	   the	   process	   of	  
specifying	  standards	  particular	  to	  each	  airworthiness	  category	  that	  provide	  assurance	  that	  levels	  of	  risk	  are,	  at	  
a	  minimum,	  equivalent	  to	  those	  of	  CPA	  operations.	  Thus,	  assessments	  of	  the	  de	  facto	  risk	  levels	  for	  CPA	  should	  
be	  used	   to	  define	   the	  de	  manifestis	   risk	   criteria	   for	  UAS	   (i.e.,	   the	  existing	  CPA	   risk	   levels	  define	   the	   limit	  on	  
what	  is	  considered	  tolerable	  for	  UAS).	  As	  discussed	  in	  §3.6,	  the	  UAS	  risk	  criteria	  should	  be	  specified	  in	  terms	  of	  
measures	  of	   the	   IR,	  CR	  and	  SR	   for	  each	   loss	  outcome	  of	  concern	   (i.e.,	  human	  casualty,	  damage	  to	  buildings,	  
etc.).	  
The	   primary	   focus	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   is	   to	   control	   the	   potential	   occurrence	   of	   flight-­‐critical	  
failures.	  In	  this	  paper,	  a	  failure	  is	  used	  to	  describe	  any	  state	  within	  the	  UAS-­‐airworthiness	  system	  (e.g.,	  people,	  
processes,	  and	  equipment	   that	  are	  components	  of	   the	  design,	  manufacture,	  maintenance,	  and	  operation	  of	  
the	  UAS)	   that,	  when	   realised,	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   primary	   hazard	   of	   a	   UAS	   impacting	   the	   ground	   during	   flight.	  
Examples	   include	   a	   failure	   of	   the	   navigation	   system,	   a	   latent	   error	   in	   flight-­‐control	   software,	   incorrect	  
maintenance	  procedures	  leading	  to	  a	  structural	  or	  propulsion	  failure	  in	  flight,	  or	  incorrect	  operator	  commands	  
that	   lead	  to	  a	  controlled	  flight	   into	  terrain.	  All	  UAS	  assigned	  to	  the	  same	  airworthiness	  certification	  category	  
are	  ultimately	  subject	  to	  the	  same	  body	  of	  airworthiness	  regulations	  and	  hence	  should	  exhibit	  a	  comparable	  
rate	  of	   flight-­‐critical	   failure.	   The	   tailoring	  of	   regulations	   is	   the	  process	  of	   ensuring	   the	  potential	   for	   a	   flight-­‐
critical	  failure	  for	  a	  given	  certification	  category,	  X,	  satisfies	  the	  following	  relationships:	  
	  
IRCPA	  	  ≥	  IRX	  	  
CRCPA	  	  ≥	  CRX	  
SRCPA(i)	  	  ≥	  SRX(i)	  	   ∀	  i	  ≥	  0,	  
Equation	  1	  
	  
where	   IRCPA,	  CRCPA,	   and	  SRCPA	  are	   the	  measures	  of	   individual,	   collective	   and	   societal	   risk	   based	  on	   the	   safety	  
performance	  of	  CPA,	  respectively.	  IRX,	  CRX,	  and	  SRX	  are	  the	  measures	  of	  individual,	  collective	  and	  societal	  risk	  
determined	  for	  the	  given	  airworthiness	  category	  X,	  respectively,	  and	  i	  is	  the	  plausible	  domain	  of	  a	  spectrum	  of	  
loss	  outcomes.	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The	  particular	  method	  for	  solving	  the	  relationships	  given	  in	  Equation	  1	  depends	  on	  the	  measure	  used	  to	  
describe	  each	  risk	  criterion	  and	  the	  model	  used	  to	  relate	  the	  potential	   for	  a	  flight-­‐critical	   failure	  to	  each	  risk	  
criterion.	   A	   description	   of	   this	   process	   specific	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   Part	   1309	   regulations	   for	   civil	   UAS	   is	  
provided	  in	  the	  next	  section.	  However,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  same	  fundamental	  process	  can	  be	  used	  
to	   tailor	   regulations	   relating	   to	  any	  aspect	  of	  UAS	   regulation,	   including	  maintenance,	  personnel	   training	  and	  
licensing,	   and	   software-­‐assurance	   levels	   [e.g.,	   the	   tailoring	  of	   software-­‐assurance	   levels	   defined	   in	  DO-­‐178B	  
(RTCA	  1992)].	  
3.7.1 Example	  –	  Tailoring	  of	  Part	  1309	  Regulations	  
Part	   13097	   regulations	   [e.g.,	   FAR	   Part	   23.1309	   or	   FAR	   Part	   25.1309	   (FAR	   2009)]	   define	   “average	   failure	  
probability	  objectives”	  to	  guide	  the	  design	  of	  a	  system	  or	  the	  modification	  or	   installation	  of	  parts	  to	  existing	  
systems.	   These	   objectives	   are	   expressed	   as	   allowable	   qualitative/quantitative	   probabilities	   assigned	   to	  
individual	  failure	  conditions	  (FAA	  1988,	  2009).	  
With	   the	   exception	   of	   a	   draft	   kinetic	   energy-­‐based	   approach	   proposed	   by	   the	   Joint	   Authorities	   for	  
Rulemaking	  on	  UAS	  (JARUS	  2009),	  the	  default	  approach	  for	  the	  definition	  of	  Part	  1309	  regulations	  for	  UAS	  is	  to	  
assign	   the	   same	   system-­‐failure-­‐probability	   objectives	   as	   used	   for	   CPA	   [c.f.,	   NATO	   (2009)].	   This	   approach	   is	  
based	  on	  the	  premise	  that	  an	  equivalency	   in	  the	  average	  probability	  of	   failure	  will	   lead	  to	  an	  equivalency	   in	  
safety.	   Reliability	   does	   not	   directly	   equate	   to	   safety	   and	   thus	   these	   approaches	   fail	   to	   recognise	   the	  
fundamental	  distinction	  that	  the	  primary	  EOV	  at	  risk	  are	  no	  longer	  onboard	  the	  aircraft,	  but	  rather	  are	  external	  
to	  the	  UA.	  In	  contrast,	  this	  paper	  advocates	  the	  tailoring	  of	  Part	  1309	  regulations	  through	  the	  use	  of	  a	  simple	  
risk	  model	   that	   relates	   safety	   criteria	   (measures	   of	   potential	   loss	   determined	   for	   CPA)	   to	  measures	   of	   the	  
potential	  for	  a	  flight-­‐critical-­‐failure	  event.	  In	  Equation	  2,	  this	  relationship	  is	  expressed	  as	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  loss	  
event	   (ELOSCPA),	   which	   is	   measured	   with	   respect	   to	   each	   of	   the	   ELOS	   criteria	   specified	   in	   Equation	   1,	   the	  
potential	   occurrence	  of	   a	   flight-­‐critical	   failure	   (FAILURE),	   and	   the	  potential	   for	   loss	   given	   the	  occurrence	  of	   a	  
flight-­‐critical-­‐failure	  (LOSS	  |	  FAILURE).	  	  
	  
ELOSCPA	  	  =	  FAILURE	  x	  LOSS|FAILURE	  	   Equation	  2	  
	  
Examples	  of	  a	  model-­‐based	  approach	  are	  presented	  by	  McGeer	  et	  al.	  (1999),	  Grimsley	  (2004),	  Weibel	  and	  
Hansman	   (2004),	   Clothier	   and	  Walker	   (2006),	   Clothier	   et	   al.	   (2007),	   and	   Dalamagkidis	   et	   al.	   (2008a,	   2009).	  
These	   existing	   models	   relate	   the	   expected	   number	   of	   casualties	   per	   flight	   hour	   (a	   measure	   of	   CR)	   to	   the	  
expected	  number	  of	  failures	  per	  flight	  hour.	  It	  is	  recommended	  that	  similar	  models	  relating	  measures	  of	  the	  IR,	  
CR	   and	   SR	   to	  measures	   of	   system	   reliability	   also	   be	   developed.	   Irrespective	   of	   the	   particular	  measure,	   the	  
general	  process	  for	  tailoring	  average	  failure	  probability	  objectives,	  as	  described	  in	  the	  following	  sections,	  is	  the	  
same.	  
3.7.1.1 Specifying	  the	  ELOS	  Objective	  (ELOSCPA)	  
In	   accordance	   with	   the	   ELOS	   objective,	   the	   Part	   1309-­‐equivalent	   regulations	   for	   UAS	   must	   ensure	   a	  
minimum	  level	  of	  safety	  equivalent	  to	  that	  exhibited	  by	  CPA.	  This	  equivalency	  may	  be	  described	   in	  terms	  of	  
the	   specification	   of	   a	   loss	   outcome	   and	   a	   measure	   of	   the	   potential	   of	   realising	   that	   outcome	   for	   CPA	  
operations	  (i.e.,	  a	  measure	  of	  risk).	  For	  example,	  McGeer	  et	  al.	  (1999),	  Grimsley	  (2004),	  Weibel	  and	  Hansman	  
(2004),	  Clothier	  et	  al.	   (2006,	  2007),	  and	  Dalamagkidis	  et	  al.	   (2008a,	  2009),	   specify	  equivalency	   in	   terms	  of	  a	  
single	  measure	  of	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  casualties	  per	  flight	  hour,	  CECPA.	  
One	  approach	  to	  specifying	  this	  benchmark	   is	   to	  conduct	  an	  analysis	  of	  CPA	  accident	  databases,	  e.g.,	  as	  
presented	   by	  Weibel	   and	  Hansman	   (2004)	   and	   Clothier	   and	  Walker	   (2006).	   These	   figures	   represent	   criteria	  
aggregated	   across	   the	   entire	   fleet	   of	   CPA.	   As	   described	   in	   paragraph	   13.c	   of	   AC-­‐23.1309-­‐1D	   (FAA	   2009),	  
processes	  are	  needed	  to	  disaggregate	  these	  criteria	  to	  individual	  aircraft	  and	  then	  to	  a	  finite	  number	  of	  failure	  
conditions.	   The	  outcome	  of	   these	  processes	   is	   a	   set	   of	  measures	  of	   IR,	   CR	   and	   SR,	   normalised	   to	   individual	  
aircraft-­‐failure	  conditions.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Although	   most	   commonly	   referred	   to	   as	   “Part	   1309”,	   these	   regulations	   are	   actually	   sections	   of	   the	  
regulations	  contained	  in	  Parts	  23,	  25,	  27	  and	  29	  (e.g.,	  FAR	  Part	  23.1309,	  FAR	  Part	  25.1309).	  To	  save	  confusion	  
with	  other	  usage	  of	  the	  term	  “section”,	  in	  this	  paper	  these	  regulations	  are	  referred	  to	  as	  “Part	  1309”. 
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3.7.1.2 Modelling	  the	  Occurrence	  of	  a	  Flight-­‐Critical	  Failure	  (FAILURE)	  
A	  model	   for	   describing	   the	   occurrence	   of	   flight-­‐critical	   failures	   is	   needed.	   The	  most	   common	   approach	  
(Grimsley	   2004;	   Weibel	   and	   Hansman	   2004;	   Clothier	   et	   al.	   2007;	   Clothier	   et	   al.	   2008;	   Dalamagkidis	   et	   al.	  
2008a,	   2009)	   is	   to	   assume	   that	   the	   occurrence	   of	   failure	   events	   may	   be	   modelled	   by	   an	   exponential	  
distribution	  with	  a	  constant	  rate	  parameter,	  λ	  (usually	  expressed	  as	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  failures	  per	  flight	  
hour	  or	  per	  mission).	  A	  large	  number	  of	  complex	  factors	  challenge	  the	  assumption	  of	  a	  constant	  failure	  rate.	  
For	  example,	   the	   rate	  of	   failure	  will	   change	  with	   increased	  experience	   in	   the	  operation	  of	  a	  given	  UAS	   type	  
[e.g.,	  the	  burn-­‐in	  or	  infant-­‐mortality	  period	  evident	  in	  Figure	  A-­‐2	  of	  OSD	  (2009)]	  and	  will	  depend	  on	  the	  type	  of	  
system	  component	  being	  modelled	   (e.g.,	   crew	  are	  more	   likely	   to	   fail	   if	   fatigued	  or	   stressed)	  and	  on	  aspects	  
specific	  to	  an	  operation	  (e.g.,	  manoeuvring	  flight	  or	  weather	  conditions).	  However,	  within	  the	  context	  of	  Part	  
1309	   regulations,	   the	   output	   needs	   to	   be	   the	   average	   failure	   rate	   (referred	   to	   as	   an	   average	   failure	  
probability),	  which	  is	  equal	  to	  λ,	  for	  small	  values	  of	  λ.	  
3.7.1.3 Potential	  for	  Loss	  Given	  a	  Flight-­‐Critical	  Failure	  (LOSS	  |	  FAILURE)	  
The	  second	  component	  of	  a	  model-­‐based	  approach	  is	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  potential	  for	  loss	  given	  the	  
occurrence	  of	  a	  flight-­‐critical	  failure.	  This	  is	  a	  complex	  model	  that	  may	  be	  broken	  into	  sub-­‐models	  describing:	  
the	  potential	  location	  of	  impact,	  the	  conditions	  on	  impact	  for	  a	  given	  type	  of	  flight-­‐critical	  failure,	  the	  exposure	  
and	  distribution	  of	  EOV,	  the	  stress	  incident	  on	  EOV,	  and	  the	  strength-­‐response	  of	  EOV	  to	  an	  incident	  stress.	  
McGeer	   et	   al.	   (1999),	   Grimsley	   (2004),	   Weibel	   and	   Hansman	   (2004),	   Clothier	   et	   al.	   (2007,	   2008),	   and	  
Dalamagkidis	   et	   al.	   (2008a,	   2009)	   present	   simplified	   models	   for	   determining	   measures	   of	   the	   casualty	  
expectation	  associated	  with	  the	  operation	  of	  UAS	  over	  populated	  areas.	  Similar	  models	  need	  to	  be	  determined	  
for	  each	  of	  the	  ELOS	  criteria	  that	  relate	  the	  occurrence	  of	  a	  flight-­‐critical	  failure	  to	  measures	  of	  the	  IR,	  CR,	  and	  
profiles	  describing	  SR.	  These	  models	  must	  be	  developed	  for	  each	  type	  of	  loss	  outcome	  of	  concern	  (e.g.,	  fatal	  
injury	  of	  people,	  damage	  to	  property,	  and	  damage	  to	  the	  environment).	  	  
The	   evaluation	   of	   these	   models	   should	   be	   specific	   to	   each	   operational	   scenario.	   For	   example,	   the	  
parameters	  input	  to	  the	  casualty-­‐expectation	  model	  presented	  in	  Clothier	  et	  al.	  (2007)	  include	  the	  population	  
density	  and	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  UA.	  The	  values	  of	  these	  input	  parameters	  may	  depend	  on	  the	  particular	  row	  
(i.e.,	  the	  operating	  environment	  over-­‐flown)	  and	  column	  (i.e.,	  type	  category	  of	  UAS).	  
3.7.1.4 Solving	  for	  the	  Average	  Failure-­‐Probability	  Objectives	  
The	   average	   failure-­‐probability	   objectives	   for	   UAS	  may	   be	   determined	   by	   combining	   Equation	   1	   and	   2.	  
Specifically,	  the	  average	  failure-­‐probability	  objectives	  may	  be	  determined	  by	  rearranging	  and	  solving	  Equation	  
2	  for	  the	  average	  flight-­‐critical-­‐failure	  rate	  against	  each	  of	  the	  measures	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  ELOS	  objective	  
(i.e.,	  IR,	  CR,	  and	  the	  profile	  characterising	  SR,	  Equation	  1).	  	  
A	   conservative	   management	   approach	   would	   then	   select	   the	   most	   stringent	   of	   the	   average	   failure-­‐
probability	  objectives	  determined	  for	  each	  certification	  category.	  This	  defines	  the	  upper	   limit	  of	   the	  average	  
probability	   per	   flight	   hour	   for	   failure	   conditions	   that	   result	   in	   the	   worst	   loss	   outcome	   (e.g.,	   defined	   as	  
“catastrophic”	   conditions	   in	   Part	   1309	   regulations).	   Based	  on	   this	   value,	   average	   probability	   objectives	  may	  
then	  be	  further	  apportioned	  to	  failure	  conditions	  that	  would	  result	  in	  loss	  outcomes	  of	  lower	  concern.	  Existing	  
definitions	  of	  failure	  conditions	  may	  require	  revision.	  It	  is	  recommended	  the	  categories	  of	  failure	  conditions	  be	  
defined	  based	  on	  the	  degree	  of	  controllability	  of	  the	  UA	  given	  the	  failure	  and	  hence	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  system	  to	  
avoid	  an	  impact	  in	  an	  inhabited	  area.	  	  
3.7.1.5 Summary	  
The	  outcome	  of	  the	  generalised	  process	  described	  in	  the	  previous	  sections	  is	  a	  tailoring	  of	  the	  Part	  1309-­‐
equivalent	  regulations	  to	  each	  of	  the	  certification	  categories	  defined	  in	  the	  certification	  matrix.	  The	  approach	  
is	   flexible	   in	   that	   regulations	   may	   be	   defined	   in	   consideration	   of	   the	   diversity	   of	   systems	   and	   operational	  
environments.	  The	  approach	  is	  systematic	  in	  that	  the	  structure	  of	  the	  risk	  matrix	  and	  the	  models	  used	  ensure	  a	  
consistent	  specification	  of	  regulations	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  risk	  associated	  with	  each	  operational	  
scenario.	  Finally,	  the	  approach	  is	  defensible	  in	  that	  the	  resultant	  regulations	  can	  be	  objectively	  verified	  against	  
the	  overarching	  requirement	  for	  an	  ELOS	  to	  CPA.	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3.8 Accommodating	  Mitigation	  Approaches	  
As	   the	   primary	   risks	   from	   UAS	   operations	   are	   to	   EOV	   external	   to	   the	   system,	   it	   is	   possible	   for	   UAS	   to	  
employ	  a	  range	  of	  mitigation	  strategies,	  both	  operational	  and	  technical,	  to	  reduce	  the	  levels	  of	  risk.	  Examples	  
include	   parachute	   recovery	   systems,	   frangible	   systems,	   autonomous	   recovery	   and	   autonomous	   flight-­‐
termination	  guidance	  systems	   [e.g.,	  Mejias	   et	  al.	   (2009)].	  Within	   the	  airworthiness	   framework	   for	  CPA,	   such	  
mitigation	  systems	  are	  addressed	  on	  a	  case-­‐by-­‐case	  basis	  (e.g.,	  the	  parachute	  flight-­‐termination	  system	  used	  
onboard	  Cirrus	  aircraft).	  However,	   for	  UAS,	  mitigation	  systems	  are	  common;	  hence,	  a	   systematic	  method	  of	  
incorporating	  them	  into	  the	  airworthiness	  certification	  framework	  is	  desirable.	  
Weibel	   and	   Hansman	   (2005)	   use	   an	   event-­‐tree	   model	   to	   describe	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   mitigation	  
measures.	  In	  this	  model,	  mitigations	  influence	  the	  probability	  of:	  
	  
1. entering	  a	  hazardous	  state	  (in	  terms	  of	  formal	  causal-­‐hazard	  analysis	  this	  is	  a	  flight-­‐critical-­‐failure	  
state),	  
2. recovering	  from	  the	  chain	  of	  failure	  states	  and	  hence	  prevention	  of	  the	   immediate	  realisation	  of	  
the	  hazard	  state,	  	  
3. reducing	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  mishap,	  or	  	  
4. combinations	  of	  the	  above.	  
	  
Using	  this	  framework,	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  different	  mitigation	  strategies	  may	  be	  systematically	  defined	  in	  
terms	  of	  permissible	  movements	  within	  the	  certification	  matrix.	  A	  mitigation	  strategy	  may	  be	  assessed	  as	  to	  
whether	  it	  contributes	  to:	  
	  
1. a	  reduction	  in	  the	  plausible	  level	  of	  loss	  (i.e.,	  representative	  of	  a	  horizontal	  movement	  within	  the	  
matrix	  –	  e.g.,	  frangible	  systems),	  	  
2. a	   reduction	   in	   the	   susceptibility	   and	  hence	  potential	   of	   a	   given	  operational	   area	   to	   register	   loss	  
(i.e.,	  representative	  of	  a	  vertical	  movement	  within	  the	  matrix	  –	  e.g.,	  operating	  only	  at	  night	  when	  
most	  people	  are	  indoors	  and	  sheltered),	  or	  	  
3. a	   combination	   of	   both	   (i.e.,	   representative	   of	   a	   diagonal	  movement	  within	   the	  matrix	   –	   e.g.,	   a	  
controlled	   parachute	   flight-­‐termination	   system	   that	   reduces	   kinetic	   energy	   and	  may	   be	   used	   to	  
control	  where	  the	  UAS	  comes	  to	  earth).	  	  
	  
Mitigation	   systems	   may	   permit	   certification	   in	   a	   lower	   airworthiness	   category,	   greater	   operational	  
freedom	   for	   a	   given	   certification	   category,	   or	   a	   combination	   of	   both.	   It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   technical	  
mitigation	   systems	   only	   address	   a	   subset	   of	   the	   possible	   failure	   conditions	   leading	   to	   an	   occurrence	   of	   the	  
primary	  hazard	  and	  may	   introduce	  new	  failure	  conditions	   into	  the	  system.	  Hence,	  standards	  and	  regulations	  
are	   required	   for	   the	   certification	   of	   technical	   mitigation	   systems.	   A	   mechanism	   for	   the	   certification	   of	  
mitigation	  systems	  could	  be	  provided	  by	   the	   issuing	  of	  a	  supplementary	   type	  certificate	   (STC)	   to	  a	  UAS.	  The	  
STC	  could	  also	  include	  details	  of	  any	  permissible	  operational	  dispensations.	  
3.9 Summary	  
Unlike	  in	  the	  CPA	  certification	  framework,	  in	  the	  proposed	  ACM,	  the	  type	  category	  alone	  does	  not	  define	  
the	  airworthiness	  category.	  Instead,	  the	  framework	  may	  be	  defined	  so	  as	  to	  prescribe	  airworthiness	  standards	  
and	  regulations	  through	  consideration	  of	  both	  the	  system	  (type)	  and	  its	  intended	  operation	  (environment).	  A	  
single	   UAS	   type	   may	   therefore	   be	   certificated	   in	   one	   or	   more	   airworthiness	   categories.	   Similarly,	   a	   single	  
airworthiness	  category	  may	  be	  applicable	   to	  more	  than	  one	  type	  category	  of	  UAS.	  The	  objective	   tailoring	  of	  
standards	  and	  regulations	  to	  the	  airworthiness	  categories	  is	  based	  on	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  and	  the	  need	  to	  satisfy	  
the	  ELOS	  objective.	  
It	   is	   likely	   that	  existing	  CPA	  prescriptive	   codes	  of	   airworthiness	   standards	  and	   regulations	   (e.g.,	   Part	  23,	  
Part	   25,	   and	  Part	   27)	  will	   be	  mandated	   for	   higher	   categories	   of	   airworthiness	   (i.e.,	   airworthiness	   categories	  
assigned	   to	   cells	   in	   the	   lower-­‐right	   corner	   of	   the	   ACM	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   3).	   However,	   airworthiness	  
categories	  that	  present	  lower	  relative	  risk	  (i.e.,	  airworthiness	  categories	  assigned	  to	  cells	  closer	  to	  the	  upper-­‐
left	   corner	   of	   the	  matrix	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   3)	  would	   necessitate	   less	   stringent	   regulation	   (e.g.,	   regulation	  
under	  a	  safety-­‐target	  approach).	  	  
Finally,	   the	   ACM	   has	   some	   added	   practical	   advantages.	   Firstly,	   the	   structure	   is	   easily	   visualised,	   thus	  
providing	   a	   simple	   tool	   for	   conveying	   airworthiness	   requirements.	   In	   addition,	   the	   compartmentalised	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structure	   facilitates	   the	   phased	   development	   and	   introduction	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations.	   Regulatory	  
development	  efforts	  could	  therefore	  be	  prioritised	  according	  to	  industry	  needs	  and	  those	  areas	  of	  immediate	  
risk	  or	  to	  capitalise	  on	  the	  availability	  of	  existing	  standards	  and	  regulations.	  
3.10 Challenges	  to	  the	  ACM	  Approach	  
Cox	   (2008)	   identifies	   a	   number	   of	   limitations	   in	   the	   use	   of	   risk	   matrices.	   Although	   the	   mathematical	  
analysis	  provided	  by	  Cox	  is	  based	  on	  the	  more	  restrictive	  position	  that	  risk	  is	  measured	  through	  an	  arithmetic	  
multiplication	  of	  its	  components,	  general	  issues	  may	  be	  identified	  from	  the	  discussion	  provided.	  	  
As	  with	  any	  assessment	  of	  risk,	  there	  is	  the	  difficulty	  of	  incorporating	  events	  with	  uncertain	  outcomes.	  As	  
described	   in	   Section	  §3.2,	   the	   concept	  of	   uncertainty	  has	  dimensions	   that	   are	  not	   captured	   in	   a	   typical	   risk	  
matrix.	  These	  include	  the	  aleatory	  uncertainties	  associated	  with	  the	  measure,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  complex	  epistemic	  
uncertainties	  associated	  with	  the	  model,	  process	  and	  data	  used	  in	  an	  assessment,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  it	   is	  
qualitative	  or	  quantitative.	  An	  additional	  dimension	  of	  the	  matrix	  providing	  a	  mapping	  of	  the	  broader	  concept	  
of	  uncertainty	  in	  the	  assessment	  could	  be	  envisaged	  [insight	  into	  how	  this	  could	  be	  structured	  is	  provided	  by	  
Stirling	  et	  al.	  (1998),	  Figure	  3].	  	  
Cox	  (2008)	  also	  states	  that	  personal	  judgements	  and	  the	  potential	  for	  inconsistencies	  “…implies	  that	  there	  
may	   be	   no	   objectively	   correct	   way	   to	   fill	   out	   a	   risk	   matrix.”	   All	   assessments	   of	   risk	   are	   inherently	   and	  
inescapably	   subjective.	   Such	   subjectivities	   are	   not	   specific	   to	   the	   assessment	   structure	   provided	   by	   a	   risk	  
matrix.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  risk	  matrices	  may	  assist	  in	  distinguishing	  between	  the	  sources	  of	  subjectivity	  within	  a	  
risk	   assessment	   and	   hence	   reduce	   potential	   stakeholder	   conflicts.	   For	   example,	   if	   stakeholders	   could	   reach	  
agreement	  on	  the	  specification	  of	  the	  dimensions	  of	  the	  matrix	  then	  the	  subjectivities	  lie	  in	  the	  assessments	  of	  
the	   subsequent	   quantification	   of	   the	   loss	   and	   its	   associated	   measure	   of	   likelihood	   or	   probability.	   An	  
encompassing	  component	  of	  any	  assessment	  is	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  stakeholder.	  Thus,	  a	  likely	  input	  to	  any	  
decision-­‐making	   process	   is	   a	   set	   of	   matrices,	   with	   each	   matrix	   representing	   a	   particular	   stakeholder’s	  
assessment	   of	   the	   risks.	   The	   mapping	   of	   all	   matrices	   to	   a	   single	   ACM	   is	   the	   output	   of	   a	   deliberative	   and	  
subjective	  process	  involving	  all	  stakeholders.	  
Throughout	   the	   previous	   section,	   the	   specification	   of	   a	  matrix	   structure	   necessitated	   that	   a	   number	   of	  
trade-­‐offs	  be	  made.	  These	  primarily	  relate	  to	  the	  scope	  of	  assessment	  and	  the	  resolution	  of	  the	  dimensions.	  In	  
addition	  to	  these	  trade-­‐offs,	  there	   is	  the	  final	  practical	   issue	  of	   international	  harmonisation	   in	  standards	  and	  
regulations.	   The	   proposed	   framework	   facilitates	   a	   tailoring	   of	   regulations	   to	   the	   industry,	   operational	  
environment,	   regulatory	   needs,	   and	   the	   political	   and	   social	   demands	   of	   a	   specific	   nation.	   For	   example,	  
Australia	  has	  a	  unique	  operating	  environment,	  unique	  applications,	  and	  a	  unique	  social	  and	  cultural	  attitude	  
towards	  aviation	  technologies	   (and	  hence	  risk	  acceptance).	  Although	   the	  matrix	  approach	  offers	   flexibility	   in	  
the	   tailoring	   of	   airworthiness	   regulations	   to	   a	   specific	   nation,	   incompatibilities	   may	   arise	   between	  
airworthiness	   frameworks	  developed	   for	  different	  nations	  and	  hence	  hinder	  UAS	  operations	   in	   international	  
airspace.	   To	   address	   this,	   regulators	   could	   either	   seek	   international	   consensus	   on	   the	   specification	   of	   the	  
matrix	   or	   could	   define	   compliance	   matrices	   that	   provide	   a	   mapping	   between	   the	   different	   airworthiness	  
categorisation	  schemes.	  	  
	  
4 Application	  to	  Airspace	  Integration	  
The	   risk	  matrix-­‐approach	   could	   also	   be	   used	   to	   structure	   regulations	   governing	   the	   integration	   of	   UAS	  
operations	  within	  civil	  airspace.	  	  
The	   primary	   hazard	   governing	   airspace	   integration	   is	   that	   of	   a	   midair	   collision	   with	   another	   aircraft	  
carrying	   people.	   A	   sense-­‐and-­‐act	   capability	   equivalent	   to,	   or	   better	   than,	   the	   see-­‐and-­‐avoid	   functionality	  
provided	   by	   a	   human	   pilot	   is	   viewed	   as	   one	   the	   most	   significant	   challenges	   facing	   the	   non-­‐segregated	  
operation	   of	   UAS	   within	   the	   NAS.	   Despite	   the	   known	   performance	   limitations	   of	   a	   pilot’s	   see-­‐and-­‐avoid	  
capability	   [see	   ATSB	   (1991)],	   the	   default	   position	   mandates	   the	   need	   for	   an	   equivalent	   functionality.	  
Equivalent	   functionality	   may	   not	   equate	   to	   equivalence	   in	   safety.	   Requirements	   on	   the	   operation	   and	  
equipage	  of	  UAS	  within	  the	  airspace	  system	  should	  be	  defined	   in	  consideration	  of	   the	  entire	  safety	  case	   [all	  
“layers”	  (ARC	  2009)]	  and	  not	  solely	  based	  on	  the	  last	  layer	  of	  defence	  provided	  by	  a	  human	  pilot.	  
A	   range	  of	   technologies	  could	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  a	  safety	  case	   for	  UAS	  operations	   in	   the	  civil	  airspace	  
system.	  It	  is	  proposed	  that	  the	  fundamental	  risk-­‐matrix	  approach	  could	  provide	  a	  systematic	  structure	  for	  the	  
assessment	   of	   such	   safety	   cases	   and	   the	   development	   of	   operational	   regulations	   commensurate	   with	   the	  
levels	   of	   risk	   presented	   by	   the	   different	   operations.	   A	   distinct	   risk	   matrix	   could	   be	   structured	   in	   a	   similar	  
fashion	  to	  that	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  3	  or,	   if	  the	  UAS-­‐type	  categories	  used	  were	  the	  same	  as	  those	  defined	  for	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airworthiness	  regulations,	  then	  the	  application	  of	  the	  risk-­‐matrix	  approach	  could	  be	  visualised	  as	  an	  extension	  
of	   the	   existing	   ACM	   into	   a	   third	   dimension	   (Figure	   5).	   The	   extra	   dimension	   would	   correspond	   to	   the	  
categorisation	  of	  airspace	  environments	  based	  on	  the	  potential	  for	  a	  mid-­‐air	  collision.	  It	   is	   important	  to	  note	  
that	   the	   airspace	   categories	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   5	  may	   not	   be	   the	   same	   as	   the	   current	   classes	   of	   airspace	  
defined	  by	  ICAO	  (e.g.,	  Classes	  A-­‐G,	  ICAO	  2001).	  The	  level	  of	  service	  provided	  by	  air-­‐traffic	  services	  is	  but	  one	  of	  
many	  factors	  that	  will	  need	  to	  be	  considered	   in	  the	  definition	  of	  this	  dimension	  of	  the	  matrix.	  These	  factors	  
may	   include:	  radar	  coverage;	  the	  distribution	  and	  number	  of	  aircraft;	   the	   level	  of	  pilot-­‐proficiency;	  equipage	  
and	  type	  of	  other	  airspace	  users;	  density	  of	  airspace	  users;	  and	  typical	  meteorological	  conditions.	  For	  example,	  
“Cat	   A”	   illustrated	   in	   Figure	   5	   could	   represent	   segregated	   airspace	   (e.g.,	   a	   prohibited	   area);	   “Cat	   B”	   could	  
represent	  a	  “managed”	  and	  “known”	  airspace	  environment	  with	  a	  low	  number	  and	  density	  of	  airspace	  users.	  
At	  the	  other	  end	  of	  the	  spectrum	  of	  airspace	  environments,	  “Cat	  Z”	  could	  represent	  airspace	  that	  is	  completely	  
unmanaged,	   has	   a	   high	   number	   and	   complex	   mix	   of	   airspace	   users,	   and	   includes	   airspace	   users	   with	   no	  
additional	  situational	  awareness	  other	  than	  that	  provided	  by	  an	  onboard	  pilot.	  This	  would	  represent	  airspace	  
of	  greatest	  potential	  for	  mid-­‐air	  collision.	  	  
The	  existing	  UAS-­‐type	  categories	   could	  also	  be	  grouped	   into	   those	  considered	  capable	  of	   causing	   flight-­‐
critical	  damage	   to	  another	  aircraft	  and	   those	   that	  are	  unlikely	   to	  cause	  substantial	  damage	   to	  other	  aircraft	  
(i.e.,	  micro	  or	  highly	  frangible	  UAS).	  This	  partitioning,	  if	  desired,	  could	  be	  based	  on	  the	  energy	  limits	  used	  for	  
certifying	  the	  resilience	  of	  an	  aircraft	  empennage	  or	  propeller	  to	  a	  bird-­‐strike	  (defined	  in	  FAR	  25.631	  and	  FAR	  
35.36,	  respectively).	  
Within	   Figure	   5	   each	   three-­‐dimensional	   cell	   would	   prescribe	   the	   airworthiness	   and	   operational	  
requirements	  proportionate	   to	   the	  degree	  of	   risk	   that	   a	   given	  UAS	   type	  presents	   to	   EOV	  over-­‐flown	  and	   to	  
other	   airspace	   users,	   respectively.	   A	   COA	   could	   then	   be	   issued	   inclusive	   of	   the	   systems	   necessary	   for	  
operations	  in	  the	  given	  airspace	  environment.	  For	  example,	  radios,	  transponders,	  sense-­‐and-­‐act	  systems,	  and	  
navigation	  systems	  can	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  the	  airworthiness	  certification	  baseline.	  
Airspace	   integration	   is	   a	   highly	   politicised	   issue,	   and	  hence	   there	   are	   likely	   to	   be	  many	  external	   factors	  
influencing	   the	   setting	   of	   regulations	   on	   UAS	   integration	   into	   the	   civil	   airspace	   system.	   However,	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  proposed	  risk-­‐matrix	  structure	  may	  aid	  the	  resolution	  of	  such	  discussions	  by	  providing	  risk-­‐
informed	   and	   justifiable	   boundaries,	   within	   which	   further	   rational	   and	   risk-­‐informed	   discussion	   may	   take	  
place.	  The	  further	  application	  of	  the	  risk-­‐matrix	  approach	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  UAS	  airspace	  integration	  is	  the	  subject	  
of	  a	  future	  paper.	  
	  
	  
Figure	  5	  –	  Illustration	  of	  a	  combined	  airspace-­‐integration	  and	  airworthiness	  certification	  strategy	  for	  
UAS	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5 Conclusion	  
UAS	  are	  a	  fundamentally	  new	  aviation	  technology	  that	  promises	  many	  benefits	  to	  society;	  however,	  they	  
also	   represent	   a	   fundamentally	   new	   risk	   paradigm	   that	   must	   be	   appropriately	   managed.	   A	   number	   of	  
limitations	  associated	  with	  the	  direct	  adoption	  of	  the	  existing	  civil	  CPA	  airworthiness	  framework	  to	  UAS	  have	  
been	  described.	  These	  limitations	  justify	  the	  need	  to	  explore	  possible	  alternatives.	  The	  objective	  of	  this	  paper	  
was	   to	   describe	   an	   approach	   that	   could	   be	   adopted	   to	   assist	   in	   the	   structuring	   of	   the	   airworthiness	  
requirements	  for	  UAS.	  For	  civil	  UAS,	  this	  approach	  could	  be	  used	  to	  structure	  a	  Part	  21-­‐equivalent	  regulation.	  
The	   proposed	   airworthiness	   certification	   matrix	   (ACM)	   offers	   flexibility	   by	   allowing	   regulations	   to	   be	  
tailored	   in	  consideration	  of	   the	   levels	  of	   risk,	   the	  practical	  and	  commercial	   limits	  of	   the	  technology,	  and	  the	  
social	   and	   political	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   regulatory	   decisions	   are	   made.	   In	   addition,	   through	   the	  
quantified	  specification	  of	  the	  framework	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  establish	  a	  transparent	  and	  justifiable	  basis	  in	  terms	  
of	  the	  overarching	  requirement	  for	  an	  ELOS.	  It	  is	  acknowledged	  that	  the	  approach	  is	  not	  without	  its	  challenges,	  
however,	   as	   stated	   by	   Bruce	   Tarbert,	   recently	   retired	   head	   of	   national	   airspace	   integration	   FAA,	   AIR-­‐160	  
Program	  Office,	  in	  an	  interview	  regarding	  the	  certification	  of	  small	  UAS:	  	  
	  
	  …	  SUAS	  (Small	  UAS)	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  certified	  for	  airworthiness	  like	  other	  aircraft	  types	  can…	  We	  need	  
to	  think	  differently,	  well	  outside	  the	  box…	  
(La	  Franchi	  2009)	  
	  
The	   basis	   of	   the	   proposed	   ACM	   approach	   does	   not	   venture	   far	   beyond	   the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   existing	  
“box”,	  with	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  being	  clearly	  visible	  in	  existing	  regulations	  for	  civil	  CPA	  (albeit	  in	  a	  less	  
explicit	  and	  structured	  manner).	  The	  systematic	  structuring	  of	  the	  problem	  space	  as	  proposed	  in	  this	  paper,	  at	  
a	  minimum,	  will	  aid	  further	  discussions	  on	  the	  development	  of	  regulations	  for	  civil	  or	  commercially	  operated	  
UAS.	  
The	  practical	  specification	  of	  the	  ACM	  for	  the	  regulation	  of	  civil	  UAS	  in	  Australia	  is	  being	  explored	  by	  the	  
Australian	   Aerospace	   Industry	   Forum	   (AAIF)	   Certification	   and	   Regulation	  Working	   Group	   Sub-­‐committee	   on	  
UAS	  Regulations.	   In	  May	  2010	  the	  AAIF	  Sub-­‐committee	  provided	  CASA	  with	  formal	  recommendations	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  regulations	  for	  civil	  UAS.	  The	  first	  recommendation	  was	  that	  the	  ACM	  approach	  be	  adopted	  as	  




The	  authors	  would	   like	   to	  acknowledge	   the	   feedback	  provided	  by	  Mr	  Michael	  Nas	   (Murdoch	  University,	  
Western	  Australia),	  Mr	  Nicholas	  Brewer	   (CAA-­‐UK)	  and	   the	   representatives	   from	  CASA,	   the	  UAS	   industry	  and	  
the	  Australian	  Department	  of	  Defence	  participating	   in	   the	  AAIF	  Certification	   and	  Regulation	  Working	  Group	  
Sub-­‐committee	  on	  UAS	  Regulations.	  All	  photographs	  used	  in	  figures	  are	  in	  the	  public	  domain.	  This	  research	  is	  
supported,	  in	  part,	  by	  a	  Queensland	  State	  Government	  Smart	  State	  PhD	  Scholarship,	  the	  Australian	  Research	  
Council's	  Linkage	  Projects	  funding	  scheme	  (project	  number	  LP100100302)	  and	  the	  Smart	  Skies	  Project,	  which	  is	  
funded,	  in	  part,	  by	  the	  Queensland	  State	  Government	  Smart	  State	  Funding	  Scheme.	  
	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  25	  of	  29	  
Bibliography	  
	  
ADF,	  2002.	  Defence	  Instruction	  (General)	  OPS	  02–2,	  Australian	  Defence	  Force	  Airworthiness	  Management.	  
Australian	  Department	  of	  Defence,	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
ARC,	  2009.	  Comprehensive	  Set	  of	  Recommendations	  for	  sUAS	  Regulatory	  Development.	  Small	  Unmanned	  
Aircraft	  System	  Aviation	  Rulemaking	  Committee.	  
http://www.faa.gov/about/office_org/headquarters_offices/avs/offices/air/hq/engineering/uapo/r
ulemaking/media/sUAS_ARC_Recs.pdf	  (Mar.	  27,	  2010).	  
AS/NZS	  ISO	  31000:2009,	  Australian/New	  Zealand	  Standard,	  Risk	  Management	  –	  Principles	  and	  Guidelines.	  
Standards	  Australia,	  Standards	  New	  Zealand.	  
ATSB,	  1991.	  Limitations	  of	  the	  See-­‐and-­‐Avoid	  Principle,	  ATSB	  Research	  Report.	  Australian	  Transport	  Safety	  
Bureau	  (ATSB),	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
http://www.atsb.gov.au/media/32918/limit_see_avoid.pdf	  (Mar.	  27,	  2010).	  
CAA,	  2008.	  Civil	  Aviation	  Publication	  CAP-­‐722,	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicle	  Operations	  in	  UK	  Airspace	  –	  Guidance.	  
London	  UK	  Civil	  Aviation	  Authority	  (CAA),	  Department	  for	  Transport	  (DfT),	  London,	  UK.	  
CASA,	  2000.	  Advisory	  Circular	  AC	  21.1(1),	  Aircraft	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Categories	  and	  Designations	  
Explained.	  Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Authority	  (CASA),	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
CASA,	  2003.	  Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Regulations	  1998	  (CASR)	  Part	  21,	  Certification	  and	  Airworthiness	  
Requirements	  for	  Aircraft	  and	  Parts.	  Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Authority	  (CASA),	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
CASA,	  2004.	  Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Regulations	  1998	  (CASR)	  Part	  101,	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  and	  Rocket	  Operations.	  
Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Authority	  (CASA),	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
CASA,	  2006.	  AC	  21-­‐43(0),	  Experimental	  Certificate	  for	  Large	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicle	  (UAV).	  Civil	  Aviation	  
Safety	  Authority	  (CASA),	  Canberra,	  ACT,	  Australia.	  
Clothier	  R.,	  Walker	  R.,	  2006.	  Determination	  and	  Evaluation	  of	  UAV	  Safety	  Objectives.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  21st	  
International	  Unmanned	  Air	  Vehicle	  Systems	  (UAVS)	  Conference,	  Bristol,	  United	  Kingdom.	  	  
Clothier	  R.,	  Walker	  R.,	  Fulton	  N.,	  Campbell	  D.,	  2007.	  A	  Casualty	  Risk	  Analysis	  for	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  System	  
(UAS)	  Operations	  over	  Inhabited	  Areas.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Twelfth	  Australian	  International	  
Aerospace	  Congress,	  2nd	  Australasian	  Unmanned	  Vehicles	  Conference,	  Melbourne,	  Victoria,	  
Australia.	  	  
Clothier,	  R.A.,	  Fulton,	  N.L.,	  Walker,	  R.A.,	  2008.	  Pilotless	  Aircraft:	  The	  Horseless	  Carriage	  of	  the	  Twenty-­‐First	  
Century?	  Journal	  of	  Risk	  Research	  11(8),	  999-­‐1023.	  
Clothier	  R.A.,	  Palmer,	  J.L.,	  Fulton	  N.L.,	  Walker	  R.A.,	  2010.	  Definition	  of	  airworthiness	  categories	  for	  civil	  
Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  (UAS).	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  7th	  International	  Congress	  of	  the	  
Aeronautical	  Sciences	  (ICAS),	  Nice,	  France.	  
Clothier,	  R.A.,	  Fulton,	  N.L.,	  Walker,	  R.A.,	  2011.	  On	  the	  Definition	  of	  a	  Safe	  System.	  Unpublished	  manuscript.	  
Cox,	  A.J.,	  2008.	  What's	  Wrong	  with	  Risk	  Matrices?	  Risk	  Analysis	  28(2),	  497-­‐512.	  
Dalamagkidis	  K.,	  Valavanis,	  K.P.,	  Piegl,	  L.A.,	  2008a.	  On	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  Issues,	  Challenges	  and	  
Operational	  Restrictions	  Preventing	  Integration	  into	  the	  National	  Airspace	  System.	  Progress	  in	  
Aerospace	  Sciences	  44(7-­‐8),	  503-­‐519.	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  26	  of	  29	  
Dalamagkidis	  K.,	  Valavanis,	  K.P.,	  Piegl,	  L.A.,	  2008b.	  A	  Survey	  of	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  Regulation:	  Status	  
and	  Future	  Perspectives.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  16th	  Mediterranean	  Conference	  on	  Control	  and	  
Automation,	  Ajaccio,	  France.	  pp.717-­‐723.	  
Dalamagkidis	  K.,	  Valavanis,	  K.P.,	  Piegl,	  L.A.,	  2009.	  On	  Integrating	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  into	  the	  National	  
Airspace	  System.	  Springer,	  New	  York	  /	  Heidelberg.	  
DeGarmo,	  M.T.,	  2004.	  Issues	  Concerning	  Integration	  of	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles	  in	  Civil	  Airspace.	  MITRE,	  
Center	  for	  Advanced	  Aviation	  System	  Development,	  McLean,	  Virginia,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
DoD,	  2000.	  MIL-­‐STD-­‐882D,	  Standard	  Practice	  For	  System	  Safety.	  United	  States	  of	  America	  Department	  of	  
Defense,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
FAA,	  1988.	  Advisory	  Circular	  25.1309-­‐1A,	  System	  Design	  and	  Analysis.	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA),	  
U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
FAA,	  2004a.	  AC	  20-­‐65A,	  U.S.	  Airworthiness	  Certificates	  and	  Authorizations	  for	  Operation	  Of	  Domestic	  and	  
Foreign	  Aircraft.	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA),	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  
Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  
FAA,	  2004b.	  Order	  8130.2F,	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  of	  Aircraft	  and	  Related	  Products.	  Federal	  Aviation	  
Administration	  (FAA),	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  of	  
America.	  
FAA,	  2009.	  Advisory	  Circular	  23.1309-­‐1D,	  System	  Safety	  Analysis	  and	  Assessment	  for	  Part	  23	  Airplanes.	  Federal	  
Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA),	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  
of	  America.	  
FAR,	  2009.	  14	  CFR	  FAR,	  Title	  14,	  Code	  of	  Federal	  Regulations,	  Federal	  Aviation	  Regulations.	  Federal	  Aviation	  
Administration	  (FAA),	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  Transportation,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  States	  of	  
America.	  
Fischhoff	  B.,	  Slovic	  P.,	  Lichtenstein	  S.,	  Read	  S.,	  Combs	  S.,	  1978.	  How	  Safe	  is	  Safe	  Enough?	  A	  Psychometric	  Study	  
towards	  Technological	  Risks	  and	  Benefits.	  Policy	  Sciences	  9(2),	  127-­‐152.	  
Grimsley	  F.,	  2004.	  Equivalent	  Safety	  Analysis	  Using	  Casualty	  Expectation	  Approach	  (AIAA-­‐2004-­‐6428).	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  AIAA	  3rd	  Unmanned	  Unlimited	  Technical	  Conference,	  Workshop	  and	  Exhibit,	  
Chicago,	  Illinois,	  United	  States	  of	  America.	  	  
Haddon,	  D.R.,	  Whittaker,	  C.J.,	  2002.	  Aircraft	  Airworthiness	  Standards	  for	  Civil	  UAVs.	  UK	  Civil	  Aviation	  Authority	  
(CAA),	  London,	  United	  Kingdom.	  
Hayhurst,	  K.J.,	  Maddalon,	  J.M.,	  Miner,	  P.S.,	  DeWalt,	  M.P.,	  McCormick,	  F.G.,	  2006.	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Hazards	  
and	  Their	  Implications	  for	  Regulation.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  IEEE/AIAA	  25th	  Digital	  Avionics	  Systems	  
Conference	  (DASC),	  Portland,	  OR,	  United	  States	  of	  America,	  pp.1-­‐12.	  
ICAO,	  2000.	  Convention	  on	  International	  Civil	  Aviation,	  Eighth	  Edition.	  International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  
(ICAO).	  
ICAO,	  2001.	  Annex	  11	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  International	  Civil	  Aviation,	  Air	  Traffic	  Services,	  Thirteenth	  Edition.	  
International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  (ICAO).	  
	  
ICAO,	  2005.	  Annex	  8	  to	  the	  Convention	  on	  International	  Civil	  Aviation,	  Airworthiness	  of	  Aircraft,	  Tenth	  Edition.	  
International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  (ICAO).	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  27	  of	  29	  
ISO	  Guide	  73:2009.	  International	  Organization	  for	  Standardization	  (ISO),	  Risk	  Management	  –	  Vocabulary.	  ISO,	  
Switzerland.	  
JAA,	  2004.	  UAV	  Task-­‐Force	  Final	  Report,	  A	  Concept	  for	  European	  Regulations	  For	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  
Vehicles	  (UAVs).	  The	  Joint	  JAA/EUROCONTROL	  Initiative	  on	  UAVs.	  
http://www.easa.eu.int/ws_prod/r/doc/NPA/NPA_16_2005_Appendix.pdf	  (Mar.	  26,	  2010).	  
JARUS,	  2009.	  JARUS	  Working	  Paper	  on	  UAS	  System	  Safety	  for	  Airworthiness	  (Draft).	  Joint	  Authorities	  for	  
Rulemaking	  on	  UAS	  (JARUS).	  
Jongejan,	  R.B.,	  Ale,	  B.J.M.,	  Vrijling,	  J.K.,	  2006.	  FN-­‐Criteria	  for	  Risk	  Regulation	  and	  Probabilistic	  Design.	  
Proceedings	  of	  the	  International	  Conference	  on	  Probabilistic	  Safety	  Assessment	  and	  Management	  
(PSAM),	  New	  Orleans,	  Louisiana,	  USA.	  	  
Kaplan	  S.,	  Haimes,	  Y.Y.,	  Garrick,	  B.J.,	  2001.	  Fitting	  Hierarchical	  Holographic	  Modeling	  into	  the	  Theory	  of	  
Scenario	  Structuring	  and	  a	  Resulting	  Refinement	  to	  the	  Quantitative	  Definition	  of	  Risk.	  Risk	  Analysis	  
21(5),	  807-­‐819.	  
Klinke	  A.,	  Renn	  O.,	  2002.	  A	  New	  Approach	  to	  Risk	  Evaluation	  and	  Management:	  Risk-­‐Based,	  Precaution-­‐Based,	  
and	  Discourse-­‐Based	  Strategies.	  Risk	  Analysis	  22(6),	  1071-­‐1094.	  
La	  Franchi	  P.,	  2009.	  The	  Long	  Road	  to	  Integration.	  Unmanned	  Vehicles	  14(4),	  46-­‐51.	  
Lin	  M.,	  Larson	  E.,	  Collins	  J.,	  2003.	  Volume	  II,	  Appendix	  D.16,	  Determination	  of	  Debris	  Risk	  to	  the	  Public	  Due	  to	  
the	  Columbia	  Breakup	  during	  Reentry.	  Columbia	  Accident	  Investigation	  Board	  (CAIB).	  
http://www.klabs.org/richcontent/Reports/Failure_Reports/columbia/caib_report/volume_2/part1
6.pdf	  (Mar.	  26,	  2010).	  	  
Luxhøj,	  J.T.,	  2009.	  Safety	  Risk	  Analysis	  of	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	  Integration	  Into	  the	  National	  Airspace	  
System:	  Phase	  1.	  Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  (FAA),	  Air	  Traffic	  Organization,	  NextGen	  &	  
Operations	  Planning,	  Office	  of	  Research	  and	  Technology	  Development,	  Washington,	  DC,	  United	  
States	  of	  America.	  
McGeer	  T.,	  2007.	  Safety,	  Economy,	  Reliability,	  and	  Regulatory	  Policy	  for	  Unmanned	  Aircraft.	  Aerovel	  
Corporation,	  White	  Salmon,	  WA,	  USA.	  
http://www.aerovelco.com/papers/RoboticAircraftSafetyAndEconomy.pdf	  (Mar.	  26,	  10)	  
McGeer	  T.,	  Newcome	  L.,	  Vagners,	  J.,	  1999.	  Quantitative	  Risk	  Management	  as	  a	  Regulatory	  Approach	  to	  Civil	  
UAVs.	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  Second	  Annual	  European	  Unmanned	  Vehicle	  Systems	  Association	  
Conference	  on	  UAV	  Certification,	  Paris,	  June.	  	  
McGeer	  T.,	  Vagners	  J.,	  1999.	  Wide-­‐Scale	  Use	  of	  Long-­‐Range	  Miniature	  Aerosondes	  over	  the	  World's	  Oceans.	  	  
The	  Insitu	  Group.	  Bingen,	  WA,	  USA.	  
Mejias	  L.,	  Fitzgerald,	  D.L.,	  Eng,	  P.C.,	  Xi	  L.,	  2009.	  Forced	  Landing	  Technologies	  for	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles:	  
Towards	  Safer	  Operations.	  In:	  Thanh	  Mung,	  L.,	  (Eds.),	  Aerial	  Vehicles.	  In-­‐Tech.	  Kirchengasse,	  
Austria.	  	  
Nas	  M.,	  2011.	  Classifying	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems:	  Development	  of	  an	  Objective	  Framework	  for	  Evaluating	  
UAS	  Classification	  Schemes.	  Masters	  Thesis,	  Murdoch	  University,	  Perth,	  WA,	  Australia.	  
NATO,	  2009.	  STANAG	  4671,	  Standardization	  Agreement,	  Unmanned	  Aerial	  Vehicles	  Systems	  Airworthiness	  
Requirements	  (USAR).	  North	  Atlantic	  Treaty	  Organization	  (NATO)	  Standardization	  Agency,	  Brussels,	  
Belgium.	  
OSD,	  2007.	  Unmanned	  Systems	  Roadmap,	  2007–2032.	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  Office	  of	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Washington	  D.C.,	  USA.	  	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  28	  of	  29	  
OSD,	  2009.	  Unmanned	  Systems	  Integrated	  Roadmap	  (2009–2034).	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  
Office	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  Defense,	  Washington	  D.C.,	  USA.	  
Paté-­‐Cornell	  E.,	  1994.	  Quantitative	  Safety	  Goals	  for	  Risk	  Management	  of	  Industrial	  Facilities.	  Structural	  Safety	  
13(3),	  145-­‐157.	  
RCC,	  2007.	  Standard	  321-­‐07,	  Common	  Risk	  Criteria	  Standards	  for	  National	  Test	  Ranges.	  Range	  Commanders	  
Council,	  United	  States	  Department	  of	  Defense,	  New	  Mexico,	  USA.	  
RTCA,	  1992.	  DO-­‐178B,	  Software	  Considerations	  in	  Airborne	  Systems	  and	  Equipment	  Certification.	  RTCA,	  
Washington	  D.C.,	  USA.	  
RTCA,	  2007.	  DO-­‐304,	  Guidance	  Material	  and	  Considerations	  for	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems.	  RTCA,	  
Washington	  D.C.,	  USA.	  
Stirling	  A.,	  1998.	  Risk	  at	  a	  Turning	  Point?	  Journal	  of	  Risk	  Research	  1(2),	  97-­‐109.	  
Weibel,	  R.E.,	  Hansman,	  R.J.,	  2004.	  Safety	  Considerations	  for	  Operation	  of	  Different	  Classes	  of	  UAVs	  in	  the	  NAS	  
(AIAA-­‐2004-­‐6421).	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  American	  Institute	  of	  Aeronautics	  and	  Astronautics	  (AIAA),	  
3rd	  Unmanned	  Unlimited	  Technical	  Conference,	  Workshop	  and	  Exhibit,	  Chicago,	  Illinois,	  USA.	  	  
Weibel,	  R.E.,	  Hansman,	  R.J.,	  2005.	  An	  Integrated	  Approach	  to	  Evaluating	  Risk	  Mitigation	  Measures	  for	  UAV	  
Operational	  Concepts	  in	  the	  NAS	  (AIAA-­‐2005-­‐6957).	  Proceedings	  of	  the	  American	  Institute	  of	  
Aeronautics	  and	  Astronautics	  (AIAA),	  4th	  Infotech@Aerospace	  Conference,	  Arlington,	  VA,	  USA.	  	  
	  
Definition	  of	  an	  Airworthiness	  Certification	  Framework	  for	  Civil	  Unmanned	  Aircraft	  Systems	   	   	  
Clothier,	  RA.	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  
©	  Copyright	  2011	  Reece	  Clothier	   	   Page	  29	  of	  29	  
Glossary	  
	  
AAIF	   Australian	  Aerospace	  Industry	  Forum	  
	  
ACM	   Airworthiness	  certification	  matrix	  
	  
ADF	  	   Australian	  Defence	  Force	  
	  
CASA	   Civil	  Aviation	  Safety	  Authority	  (Australia)	  
	  
COA	   Certificate	  of	  Airworthiness	  
	  
CONOPS	   CONcept	  of	  OPerationS	  	  
	  
CPA	  	   Conventionally	  piloted	  aircraft	  
	  
CR	   	   Collective	  risk	  
	  
DSTO	   Defence	  Science	  and	  Technology	  Organisation	  
	  
ELOS	   Equivalent	  level	  of	  safety	  
	  
EOV	   Entities	  of	  value	  
	  
FAA	  	   Federal	  Aviation	  Administration	  
	  
ICAO	   International	  Civil	  Aviation	  Organization	  
	  
IR	   	   Individual	  risk	   	  
	  
NAS	   National	  Airspace	  System	  
	  
SR	   	   Societal	  risk	  
	  
STC	  	   Supplementary	  type	  certificate	  
	  
SUAS	   Small	  unmanned	  aircraft	  system/s	  
	  
UA	   	   Unmanned	  aircraft	  
	  
UAS	  	   Unmanned	  aircraft	  system/s	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
